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Last| Chapter 1: Forced Labour and Forced Conscription | ||||||||||||||||
Despite Burma’s ratification of the International Labour Organisation’s (ILO) Forced Labour Convention 1930 (No. 29) in 1955, there continued to be countless credible reports of the widespread use of forced labour by the ruling junta; the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), throughout 2006. Forced labour in Burma takes many forms, from the construction of roads and infrastructure, including projects for gas pipelines carried out in collaboration with multinational corporations, through to the building of military bases, forced sentry duty and forced porting for the military. The primary victims of forced labour are innocent villagers, and increasingly, prisoners from the Burmese penal system. Furthermore, there continued to be numerous reports of villagers being forcibly conscripted into the military and into forming local militia groups. The most prevalent use of forced labour has been in the ethnic minority rural areas of Burma where it has long been shown that an increase in the military’s presence results in an increase in human rights violations, including forced labour. In 2006 the ongoing military offensives against Karen, Mon and other ethnic resistance groups have increased the militarisation of many areas. The expansion of troop deployment has been a major factor for the continued use of forced labour in 2006, particularly in the Karen areas of Toungoo, Nyaunglebin and Papun, as well as in Kwar Zar sub-Township in Mon State. Thousands of civilians have been forced into portering for the offensive in Karen State, as well as thousands of prisoners who are often subsequently summarily executed. [2] Furthermore, the establishment of mining enterprises, hydro electric dam sites and gas pipelines are concomitant with an increase in SPDC military presence around these areas, ensuring a secure zone around the site. [3] An increase in forced labour as well as other human rights abuses has been shown to generally accompany such a military build up. In ethnic areas where the SPDC has already established military control, instances of forced labour remain commonplace used to sustain a hierarchical militarised society where civilians are at the mercy of the military and are used to serve their needs. In northern Arakan State, reports of forced labour have been on the increase since the SPDC military took over the entire area in March 2005. [4] Similarly, in Thaton District, arguably the most extensively controlled of all seven Karen Districts, the SPDC and Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) made frequent demands for forced labour upon local villagers throughout 2006. [5] As stated by Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of Human Rights in Burma, in February 2006:
Mindful of international condemnation of the use of forced labour, in recent years the SPDC have employed new tactics when requisitioning labour to try and avoid criticism. The SPDC has for a long time tried to justify their use of forced labour through semantics. The terminology used to describe the practice by the SPDC is “loh ah pay” which refers to the Buddhist notion of contributing voluntary labour to gain merit, and in 2006 it was reported that local authorities were informing villagers that they had to contribute to the development of their area by repairing the roads in front of their houses as well as working in public areas. During a press conference in December 2006, Deputy Minister of Labour Maj. Gen. Aung Kyi, denied the use of forced labour but asserted that the SPDC was justified in requesting its citizens to work in certain cases, including “tasks for regional development”. [7] Whereas, in the past, written orders were frequently distributed to villages to supply labour, the SPDC has increasingly used only verbal orders issued at meetings with village headmen and local VPDCs who then instruct their villages what they are required to do; thus distancing themselves somewhat from the orders and doing away with any paper trail. [8] The position of village heads does in itself amount to a form of forced labour. Incumbents are forced to assign villagers to perform labour for the SPDC, report visitors to the village, and summon villagers for interrogation and torture at the army camp. They are also unable to give over enough time to sustaining their own livelihoods, and face greater risk of abuse at the hands of the military. In 2006, the SPDC issued orders in areas of Burma insisting that village council chairmen are not permitted to resign from their posts. [9] There has also been a reported increase in the use of the members of GONGOs in forced labour practices, justified by the fact that such groups contain in their mandates points of national development. [10] However, given that such organisations rely on forced recruitment in the first place, the coercion is again simply one step removed. Further, the SPDC has increased its use of convict labour, again seemingly to cloud international condemnation. In one instance in 2006, the SPDC employed forced prison labourers whilst forcing them to wear the uniforms of the auxiliary fire brigade and army, thus disguising their forced employment. [11]
Continual demands for forced labour place a huge strain on villagers’ daily lives and livelihoods. The time spent performing forced labour takes villagers away from their own fields and jobs, leaving crops vulnerable to animals, and reducing yields at harvest time. Education is also adversely affected. Villagers informed the Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG), that they were only able to study for one week out of every three or four due to the demands of forced labour. Such impacts of forced labour on the lives of villagers is a major cause for villagers to flee their homes when the military approaches and settles in their area, fleeing either into the surrounding jungle as IDPs or crossing the border into a neighbouring country. KHRG assert that most of the internal displacement that occurs in Thaton District comes about because of this. [12] Hopes of a change in the regime’s attitude towards forced labour surfaced in 2005 when perpetrators of the practice were officially prosecuted for the first time. Su Su Nway, a Burmese labour activist, successfully brought convictions against local officials who forced villagers to work on a road building project for which they received sentences of 8 months. However, hopes were short lived, as in October 2005 Su Su Nway was countersued for “abusing” state officials and sentenced to 18 months in prison. This trend continued, and other cases were brought against people for supposedly making “false reports” to the ILO on the use of forced labour. In 2006 the issue of prosecuting complainants remained high on the agenda in the negotiations between the junta and the ILO in Geneva. The regime’s relationship with the ILO had been steadily deteriorating during 2005 due to its lack of cooperation on addressing the issue of forced labour. 2006 saw a significant toughening of the ILO’s stance towards the Burmese regime, after years of trying to engage them in effective dialogue had resulted in no significant progress. At the ILO Governing Body meeting in March 2006 the members agreed to begin reviewing new courses of action which could be taken against the regime for its non-compliance with the Forced Labour Convention. The key sticking point was the continued lack of any viable complaints mechanism for accusations of forced labour, and the new practice of prosecuting people for “false complaints”. Three options for future action were presented the annual ILO conference in June. Two involved referring Burma to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the other would see the establishment of an ad hoc tribunal to rule on the matter. In response to this increased threat of international legal measures the regime released Su Su Nway during the conference, and later released another high profile prisoner, Aye Myint, who was being held on similar charges. Even though the regime had taken some steps to address the ILO’s concerns it was widely felt among members that the actions did not go far enough and as a result the ILO remained firm on its insistence that effective action on the establishment of a complaint mechanism had to be made by November 2006. This deadline subsequently passed with no further progress on the issue. The ILO Governing Body then agreed to begin full preparations to refer Burma to the ICJ for an advisory opinion on the matter and placed the issue on the agenda for a final decision at the Governing Body meeting in March 2007. 2006 also saw the start of the distribution of US$6.12 million from the settlement of the Total lawsuit in 2005. The majority of the funds were allocated for use by humanitarian aid organisations working with Burmese refugees in Thailand. Several organisations refused the money but two, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and the National Catholic Commission on Migration (NCCM) did agree to accept and distribute the financial aid. Other international joint ventures such as the Salween Dams and the Shwe Gas Project continued to be negotiated with many human rights groups worried that they too will result in an increase in human rights violations in the future, including the use of forced labour. Forced Portering Throughout 2006 reports continued of civilians and prisoners being forced to carry goods and supplies for the SPDC military. Portering is a particularly dangerous form of forced labour as victims are often overloaded with goods and given no time to rest. If the porters collapse they are often beaten, murdered, or simply left by the side of the road to die. Porters are often forced to walk at the front of the convoy to protect the soldiers from landmines. [13] In previous years civilian porters were often taken by a battalion and used for several weeks on end, however in the last two years, a column of soldiers will more likely pass through a village and demand “emergency porters” to carry goods to the next village where they will be released if another porter can be secured. [14] According to KHRG the use of prisoners for the heavy portering duties has increased. (For more information see the following section regarding Forced Convict Labour). The baskets that the porters carry can contain anything from food and clothing to ammunition and mortar shells with the average load weighing between 16 and 33 kgs. Porters are very often not supplied with food and have to carry their own rations in addition to their loads. The practice of forced portering takes villagers away from their fields and livelihoods and therefore directly affects whole families and communities. In some cases, especially if civilians are too sick or weak to carry loads, they will hire itinerant labourers to work as porters in their place. [15] Military camps are supplied with monthly or bi-monthly rations which are often brought by truck to a central point from where villagers are used to transport the rations to the individual camps. There have been reports of hundreds of civilians at a time being used for these operations. For example, in May 2006 in Toungoo District, 850 villagers were taken for just one of these camp re-supplies. [16] The use of forced porters has actually decreased in some areas in 2006, most notably in northern Arakan State, where this trend can be attributed to the improvement of road networks to the military bases, meaning goods can now be transported by vehicles instead of using civilian porters. [17] However, the overall increase in the road network allows the SPDC to more easily extend its control over the population, and residents in northern Arakan experienced increased demands for other forms of forced labour throughout 2006. In addition to the widespread use of forced porters by the SPDC military, and armed groups aligned to the regime, there have also been reports of their use by opposition groups such as the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA). However, in contrast to their treatment by the SPDC, reports suggest that KNLA porters are at least provided with food and medical treatment of the same standard as the soldiers, although this is still of a relatively poor quality. In addition they are reported not to be tortured, mistreated or used as human minesweepers. [18] Forced Labour For many years the SPDC military have routinely forced civilians to work on state infrastructure projects, such as the building of roads, bridges, towns, military bases and various economic enterprises, and 2006 was no exception. Wherever these projects are carried out, the military will typically demand labour from local villages, with the threat of fines if households are unable to supply the required amount of people. Projects vary in length, but always mean that people are taken away from their land and livelihoods and are not given any remuneration in return. In addition, the forced labourers are often expected to supply their own tools, materials and food, which all result in severe economic hardship. [19] In 2006 the practice of forced labour continued unabated, particularly in the ethnic border areas. The increased militarization which has accompanied the large scale offensive in the northern Karen areas has produced weekly reports of forced labour in Toungoo District. The most common types of work civilians are forced to do in these areas are the clearing of land, road building, and the construction and maintenance of military camps as well as the regular clearing of vegetation from roadsides to reduce the possibility of the SPDC troops being ambushed as they use the roads. [20] In Northern Arakan State, forced labour has been on the increase during 2006 and the type of labour has changed with the seasons. In the rainy season villagers are forced to cultivate paddy fields for the military as well as clear areas of jungle, while at the same time they are busy with their own crop cultivation. In the dry season the nature of the forced labour changed to demands for brick baking, road and village construction, wood collection and crop procurement. A number of new road projects used forced labour in 2006, mostly in Buthidaung and Maungdaw Townships, the roads link military bases to towns and to other bases, and are designed to facilitate the movement of troops and supplies. The construction of “model villages” for Buddhist settlers also continued in Arakan State during the dry season. Local Muslim villagers not only had their land confiscated, but were forced to supply building materials and construct the settlers’ villages. All of this seasonal labour is in addition to the year round demand for sentries, porters and labourers to maintain the military bases. [21] A new development in forced labour began in January 2006 with the SPDC announcing an ambitious new “national project” which compels people throughout the country to grow physic nuts. These nuts produce oil which can be used as an alternative to diesel fuel, which, if produced on a large scale could potentially save the regime millions of dollars in foreign exchange due to rising oil prices. [22] The SPDC plans to cultivate 500,000 acres in each state, which has already led to the confiscation of fertile land in many areas. Villagers have been instructed to plant the nurseries around their homes or face fines, and forced labour has frequently been used to prepare, plough and maintain the plots of land for the nurseries. It is feared that once the saplings are matured, more land will be confiscated and more forced labour used to establish large scale plantations. (For more information see Chapter 5: Deprivation of Livelihood) When the SPDC troops enter a village and make their demands for forced labour, their task is made easier by the existence of registration documents which detail the exact number of inhabitants, property and livestock within a village. Inhabitants have no choice but to apply for national identity cards and register their details or risk arrest or fines. This information is then used by the soldiers to tailor their demands for labour and materials. [23] Forced labourers in Burma are very rarely remunerated for their labour or even costs incurred during their employment, such as for food and tools. Regardless, the SPDC will often extort money in the name of such payment. Throughout 2006, fees were collected from civilians under the pretext that the money would be used to pay those contributing their labour to state projects in the area. The pretence is a complete sham, with villagers fully aware that their money will not be paid to their peers but will instead line the pockets of local officials and senior army officers. [24] Other pretences utilised by the army in 2006, were in some ways crueller, given that local villagers actually believed them. For example, in North Buthidaung Township, Arakan State, SPDC forces announced that they would rent out their land against the supply of a number of baskets of paddy per acre. Once villagers had completed the ploughing and planting of their acres, the SPDC reclaimed the land, employing forced labourers to continue their work. [25] Although the use of prison labour is not specifically prohibited by the Forced Labour Convention, the ILO does not support the practice [26] and in the case of Burma, the severe manner in which it is employed is in clear contravention of regulations within the Convention and also Article 3 common to all four of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, to which the SPDC is a signatory, and is acknowledged to be customary international law, regardless. Human rights organisations have reported an increase in the use of forced prison labour in Burma in recent years and especially in 2006. Some prisoners are sentenced to serve terms of ‘prison with hard labour’ and are sent to prison labour camps, where it has been estimated that as many as 20 percent of prisoners die because of the conditions of their detention. There are thought to be 110 such camps, throughout Burma, with between 50 and 1000 inmates in each of them. Prisoners are forced to work from 6 am to 6 pm, without rest, bar one meal break. The sick are not exempted from their work. [27] (For more information see Chapter 3: Arbitrary Detention and Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances). One Chin woman interviewed by Christian Solidarity Worldwide, told of her visit to a labour camp, 55 miles outside of Kalaymyo on the road to the Indian border. Prisoners were reported to be yoked around the neck and forced to work ploughing the fields, akin to the treatment of buffalo. [28] Whilst those sent to such camps are often informed at their trial that they will be required to perform hard labour as part of their sentence, for many others, there is no mention of the fact that they will be required to perform labour during their sentence. KHRG reports that thousands of prisoners have been brought from prisons around Burma to carry supplies and act as minesweepers as part of the large scale offensive in the northern Karen areas which began in November 2005. [29] It is believed by many that this move towards a greater use of convict porters has been a means to try and deflect international criticism. The rights of prisoners are generally less clear cut than those of civilians and the SPDC may well hope that because of this, they will receive less criticism with labour and rights activists less likely to take up their case . [30]
On 22 August 2006 it was reported that the SPDC military authorities had begun the transfer of thousands of prisoners from across Burma to northern Karen areas to serve as porters for military columns in the ongoing offensive. The military transferred porters from prisons across the country including Rakhine, Kachin and Shan States and Mandalay, Rangoon, Irrawaddy, Pegu and Magwe Divisions. Most were sent to military bases along the Kyauk Kyi – Saw Hta road in Mone Township, northern Nyaunglebin District and Lu Thaw Township, northern Papun District. Some prisoners were transited via various prisons along the way or where the offensive battalions were based, namely those at Toungoo, Thaton and Moulmein. Convicts from Thayet prison in Magwe Division were sent to Insein Prison near Rangoon and then to Moulmein Prison in Mon State, where they were handed to a battalion that took them to Karen areas. From these bases and prisons, porters were assigned to battalions under the control of MOC #10, MOC #15 and LID #101 to be used in operations throughout Tantabin Township, southern Toungoo District, Lu Thaw Township and Mone Township. All of the prisoners were deployed in Papun and Nyaunglebin Districts. Almost half of them were sent to Baw Hser Ko, an SPDC military base overlooking Pwa Ghaw along the Kyauk Kyi – Saw Hta road in western Papun District. Other Army bases from which prisoners were deployed were strung out along the Kyauk Kyi – Saw Hta road at (from west to east) Kyauk Kyi, Mu Theh, Plah Ko, Yunzalin camp (near Maw Pu) and Saw Hta; some were also sent to Pah Heh camp just north of Papun. Prisoners being sent to Toungoo District were brought to Kler Lah and then deployed to Army camps throughout the District. Previous reports have also documented the large-scale use of convict porters in 2006 by MOC #16 and MOC #21 in Nyaunglebin District and by LID #66 in Toungoo District. [31] It has been claimed that the SPDC takes prisoners from areas far away from where the offensive is taking place, so as the porters will be less likely to try to escape, not knowing the language or area, and being fearful of treatment by insurgents in the area. [32] A constant supply of prison labour is assured by the continuing arbitrary arrest of civilians by the SPDC, as well as the imposition of lengthy sentences for minor misdemeanours. Those arrested are often dealt with without any due legal process and told they will be released on payment of a bribe. Those who are unable to pay the police or the judiciary are automatically sent to prison, whether there is evidence against them or not. Many escaped porters interviewed by KHRG reported that police officers had demanded between 10,000 and 500,000 kyat for their release after being arrested. [33] At no time during their sentencing were these prisoners told that they will be forced to work for the military. When prisoners are rounded up and transferred to military bases they are often given the opportunity to bribe the prison officers to avoid being taken. [34] The living conditions, food supplies and general treatment of forced prison labourers are widely reported to be far worse than for civilian forced labourers. The work is more dangerous and health provisions are non-existent. The military view the prisoners as expendable labour and there are countless reports of their torture, beatings and killings. [35] It is common for convict porters to carry loads of between 33 and 44 kgs, much heavier than their civilian counterparts. As a consequence of overwork and poor conditions, prison labourers frequently fall ill and suffer injury. Neither illness nor injuries are treated by the army medics, who state explicitly that medical care and medicine is only for soldiers. Regardless of the severity of their condition, porters are forced to continue at the pace of the soldiers and hence often die from illness or exhaustion, or killed for not being able to keep up. [36] One escaped convict porter, who had portered for LIB #251 as they moved from Thaton to Papun District, reported that they were told, “You are going on a pilgrimage. If you can’t continue, you won’t be left behind alive.” [37] Forced Military Conscription Following the pro democracy demonstrations of 1988, the Burmese junta began a large scale expansion of its military forces, requiring many more recruits leading to much forced recruitment into the ranks of the army. This forced recruitment into the tatmadaw continued throughout 2006, mirrored and impelled by high rates of desertion throughout the year. [38] In 2006, one Major whom had defected from the SPDC, to the Kachin Independence Organisation, told Christian Solidarity Worldwide, that each month every battalion is ordered to recruit at least five new soldiers. If they cannot meet the quota they face a fine. If they are able to exceed the quota they are rewarded with a bonus and the opportunity for promotion. [39] Children are frequently targeted in such recruitment drives, being vulnerable and more easily connived. In Mong Ku District, northern Shan State, over 30-40 children, aged between 15-16 years old, have reportedly been forcibly recruited from one Township alone in 2005 and 2006. A report in June 2006 suggested that as many as five children were recruited each day at Rangoon’s main railway station. [40] Elderly men, in no physical condition to serve in the armed forces, are also targeted. [41] The most frequent tactic used by SPDC recruiters is to give their targets the option “join the military or go to jail.” Recruiters often “lurk in train stations and other places where impoverished children not attending school during the day can be found,” promising children good salaries and opportunities. [42] Often, recruiters ask a child if he has a national I.D. card. If, as is often the case, he does not have an ID card, the recruiters threaten the child with arrest if he refuses to join the military. [43] Homeless children, orphans and street traders are particularly vulnerable to the threat of arrest for ‘loitering’ or trading without a license. [44] In some instances, the Burmese police sell young offenders directly to military recruitment camps. On 22 August 2006, three 15 year old boys, Than Naing Aye, Lin Lin and Yan Lin Maung, were sold in such a way by Police Lt. Sgt. Min Aung Thein from No.1 Police Station Meikhtila, Mandalay Division. They were sold to Mandalay Taung Thone Lone Army Recruitment Camp for 65,000 kyat. They had been arrested on 3 August and charged with theft. [45] Officers at recruitment camps then sell recruits to individual battalions. [46] The practice of compulsory military training and forced conscription into local militias also continued in 2006, notably in Arakan and Mon State as well as Thaton District. Reports continued of SPDC officials issuing orders to villages to set up militia groups to help protect the state’s interests, and in particular, to assist the SPDC forces in controlling dissidents and dealing with external security threats. [47] In 2006, in Arakan State, the SPDC forcibly recruited and trained civilians to serve alongside Fire Brigade and Red Cross members in increasingly large militia forces. The reasons given for such recruitment, included the threat posed by the U.S. to local Muslims, as well as the threat of elements, both inside and outside the country, disrupting gas exploration in the area. [48] These auxiliary militia forces have been around since 2000 and are formed under pseudonyms such as the ‘Anti-Foreign Invasion Force’ or the ‘People’s Vigorous Association’ (PVA). Villages in Thaton District were forced to pay a fine of up to 80,000 kyat a year if they failed to supply the required number of persons for the training. As the SPDC does not pay the members of the militias, the villages are forced to provide food and shelter for them. [49] Often people are first forcibly recruited into one of the SPDC’s numerous GONGOs, and then required as members to attend military trainings and serve in militias. Members of GONGOs are also utilized in the recruitment of non-members into such militias. [50] The PVA, for example, is made up of Myanmar Red Cross members, ‘firemen’, troops, Myanmar Women’s Affair Association members, Maternal and Child Welfare Association members, Retired Soldier's Organization members, village militias, and the members of the USDA. [51] An SPDC press statement in 2006 asserted that the mandate of the Auxiliary Fire Brigade and the Myanmar Red Cross was to “crush the destructive elements who have encroached upon perpetuation [sic] of the sovereignty.” [52] In the run up to Martyr’s day in 2006, state run media threatened that any demonstrations would be countered by ’people’s power-holder members', a euphemism for such militia forces. [53] Reports from inside Burma claim that the junta has ordered authorities in large cities across the country to train as many as 5,000 people each, with the USDA not only providing recruits but financial and material assistance. [54] In keeping with such a move, in October 2006, it was reported that the junta was planning to launch a national conscription service for a people’s militia, a proposal that had reportedly been agreed upon by delegates at the SPDC controlled National Convention process for the drafting of a new constitution. [55]
In July 1998 the ILO reported that forced labour was practiced in Burma in “a widespread and systematic manner”. [56] Since that time, the ILO has attempted to engage with the Burmese regime to bring about and end to this practice. In November 2000, the ILO made moves to invoke Article 33 of its constitution which allows member states to take actions to pressure a government into complying with its recommendations. The members threatened Burma with the imposition of trade and other sanctions if it did not discontinue the use of forced labour. In response, the Burmese regime issued a Supplementary Order to Order No. 1/99, which made forced labour a criminal act and specified that this order applied to all persons, including authorities, members of the armed forces, police and public servants. In addition they allowed the ILO to open a regional office in Rangoon and in March 2002 to appoint a Liaison Officer to Burma. After further negotiations, the SPDC agreed with the ILO to a “Joint Plan of Action for the Elimination of Forced Labour Practices in Burma” which was signed by both parties on 28 May 2003. The plan was designed to demonstrate that the SPDC could take clear and decisive steps toward ending forced labour including the implementation of new procedures for the filing and investigation of allegations of forced labour. Implementation of the plan was then suspended twice, firstly following the Depayin Massacre and the crackdown on pro-democracy supporters and again in November 2004 when three Burmese citizens received death sentences for their contact with the ILO and the Federation of Trade Unions Burma. Previously the SPDC had allowed the ILO to appoint a facilitator to help victims bring forced labour cases to the courts, but in November 2004 the ILO Liaison Officer in Rangoon reported that the regime’s methods for dealing with complaints was inadequate and represented a conflict of interests, as allegations of forced labour by the military were referred to the Ministry of Defence and as such, the cases were routinely dismissed.
In April 2005 the relationship with the ILO became further strained by the SPDC’s announcement that “false” allegations of forced labour were detrimental to the dignity of the State and, as such, legal action would be taken against the complainants. This lead to the conviction of Su Su Nway on 13 October 2005 who was counter-sued after she had successfully secured the prosecution of local officials in Htan Minaing and Mya Sinnai villages in Rangoon Division for perpetrating forced labour. She was sentences to 18 months in prison. Two further notable cases include the sentencing on 31 October 2005 of Aye Myint, a lawyer from Pegu, to seven years in prison after allegedly supplying “false information” to the ILO in relation to his assistance to a group of farmers who had their land confiscation by the military. [58] Similarly, three NLD members, Thein Zan, Zaw Htay and Aung Than Tun from Aunglan, Magwe Division, had cases brought against them on 20 October 2005 for giving “false information” to the ILO when reporting the death of Win Lwin, a villager from Ngapyin, who died during a forced labour session in December 2001. [59] At the subsequent meeting of its Governing Body in November 2005, the ILO expressed grave concern at the deteriorating situation in Burma, particularly in relation to the legal measures being taken against those who report incidents of forced labour. They were also severely critical of the regime’s attempts to pressurise and intimidate the ILO by using state-sponsored organisations to hold protest rallies against their involvement in Burma. In addition, a series of death threats were made against the Liaison Officer. This resulted in the Governing Body recommending that the ILO members revisit the issue of actions against Burma at their conference in 2006. [60] In March 2006, Richard Horsey, the ILO Liaison Officer in Burma, submitted a report to the meeting of the ILO Governing Body in which he further stated his concerns regarding the lack of a competent authority to which he could refer complaints of forced labour for investigation. He declared that this will “tend to reinforce the climate of impunity surrounding government officials who have recourse to forced labour”. He also noted how the recent convictions of complainants of forced labour was undermining any previous progress made on this issue and called for a speedy resolution of this issue, referring specifically to the three cases mentioned above. The question of his own personal safety was subsequently considered closed after he received assurances from the Minister for Labour. [61] On the final day of the two-week long meeting, the ILO Governing Body put forward a resolution to “review what further action could be taken by the ILO in accordance with its Constitution in order (i) to effectively secure Myanmar’s compliance with the recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry and (ii) to ensure that no action is taken against complainants or their representatives.” [62] Crucially this resolution differs from previous statements as it is not solely a question of reactivating the previous measures from 2000, but opens the door to discussions on additional measures. [63] As such the Governing Body was instructed to prepare an analysis on all the available options in time for the annual ILO members’ conference in June 2006. [64] In the following months, the investigative work of the ILO office in Rangoon remained effectively stalled as no new cases of forced labour could be referred on, for fear of prosecution of the complainants. The ILO concluded that this situation “contradicts the very raison d’être of the ILO presence” [65] in Burma and subsequently drew up three possible courses of further action to be presented at the members’ conference. [66] The three courses of actions refer specifically to the regime’s practice of prosecuting complainants and its incompatibility with Forced Labour Convention No. 29. Option one involved an ILO member requesting a binding ruling from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) which would then be enforceable by the United Nations Security Council. Option two would see the establishment of an ad hoc ILO tribunal to rule on the matter and option three involved the ILO requesting an advisory opinion from the ICJ which although not binding, would carry significant judicial weight. Further, requests for advisory opinions do not enter the queue of contentious cases before the Court, and are therefore dealt with more quickly. [67] The 2006 annual ILO conference began on 31 May and during the two weeks there were an unprecedented one and a half days of meetings to discuss the situation in Burma and the possible course of actions. The representative for the Burmese junta responded to the negotiations by announcing on 3 June that they would “place a six month moratorium on the prosecution of complainants on an experimental basis” during which time any new complaints would be dealt with jointly by the Director General of the Department of Labour and the ILO Liaison Officer. In addition, as a goodwill gesture, they also announced they would release Su Su Nwe. [68] On 6 June 2006, Su Su Nwe was indeed released from Rangoon’s Insein prison. Her release was welcomed by many including the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan who urged the Burmese authorities to follow up this action with the “lifting of remaining restrictions” on over 1000 other political prisoners including opposition leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. [69] At the conference, the Burmese authorities appealed to ILO members to see their recent steps as evidence of their willingness to cooperate with the organisation and urged them not to adopt any of the further “harsh measures” being discussed. [70] Although the ILO welcomed the actions by Burma, the general consensus among members was that the steps “came very late and did not go far enough,” said Richard Horsey. [71] However, they did feel that the path of cooperation and dialogue could be continued on the proviso that “any such cooperation needed to rapidly produce tangible and verifiable action from Myanmar towards the implementation of the recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry”. To demonstrate its insistence on this matter the ILO then set a deadline of November 2006 (the next Governing Body meeting) for tangible progress to have been made on the establishment of a credible complaints mechanism. The ILO also demanded that the regime release Aye Myint and cease all pending prosecutions on other forced labour complainants. [72] On 8 July, Aye Myint was released from Pegu prison after serving nine months of his seven year sentence. The ILO welcomed the release and confirmed that they were not aware of any other people still being detained in Burma for similar offences. [73] On 27 September 2006, following continual adjournments in the case, the SPDC announced to the UN Human Rights Council, that the three Aunglan NLD members had been freed of all charges. [74] However, on 10 November 2006, Altsean reported that nine persons sentenced in November 2005 remained imprisoned following making complaints to the ILO. Wai Lin received a 25 years sentence while another defendant, Win, was given 17 years. The remaining seven people, Thein Lwin Oo, Ye Myint, Hla Myint Than, Aye Chan (f), Aye Thi Khaing (f), Yin Kyi (f) and Myint Lwin each received 8 year prison terms. [75] The deadline for the Burmese regime to establish a credible forced labour complaints mechanism expired at the start of the ILO Governing Body meeting on 14 November with no tangible progress having been made. All three member groups of the ILO, the Workers, Employers and the majority of Governments agreed on a toughening of their stance towards Burma. In their concluding statement the Governing Body expressed “great frustration that the Myanmar authorities had not been able to agree on a mechanism to deal with complaints” and criticised the regime for missing “a critical opportunity to demonstrate a real commitment to cooperating with the ILO…, which once again raised serious questions as to whether any such commitment existed.” [76] As a result, the Governing Body agreed to place an agenda item for their next session in March 2007 to move forward on the legal options outlined during the June 2006 conference, including making full preparations to request an advisory opinion from the ICJ. They also stated that ILO Director General Juan Somavia could make information available to the United Nations Security Council when they next come to consider the Burma situation and also to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) for use in any future proceedings. The ICC has the authority to prosecute individuals, including military and government officials, for the most serious crimes within the international community. Forced labour could conceivably fall under the crime of “enslavement” which is referred to as a “crime against humanity”. [77] The unprecedented move towards legal action against the SPDC was seen by many ILO members to be crucial to ensure the credibility of the organisation and to demonstrate that they take the issue seriously. [78] Director General Jean Somavia commented in November that “Forced labour is a scourge on humanity. Any government or regime intent on perpetrating it will clash with the ILO head on…The ILO has been committed to dialogue with the Burmese authorities to solve the problem, but for some time now the message hasn’t been getting through….The door is still open, but if negotiations are not conducted in good faith, then other ways have to be explored”. [79] However, some member countries particularly from Asia claimed that dialogue was still the best course of action. While the ICJ itself has no power to enforce a potential ruling, it could be referred to and enforced by the Security Council. [80] Russia asserted it would not accept the authority of an advisory opinion by the ICJ as binding. [81]
1.3 Forced Labour Resulting from International Joint Ventures The Settlement of the Total Lawsuit Total, the French multinational oil and gas company were involved in a consortium in the 1990s to develop the off-shore Yadana gas field in the Andaman Sea and construct a 65km gas pipeline across Burma to Thailand. The SPDC military were contracted to provide security for the project. During the construction of the pipeline the military engaged in serious and widespread human rights abuses including the widespread use of forced labour. In the following years several lawsuits were brought against consortium members, namely Unocal and Total, centring on their knowledge, complicity and liability for the human rights abuses carried out by the military during the project. Total has been sued in two separate lawsuits, the first in the French courts in 2002 and the second in the Belgian courts, where the case was finally dismissed in 2005. The French case was brought by eight Burmese citizens who claimed that the military forced them to work on the pipeline construction site with threats of physical violence and death and that the Total executives were present at the sites and witnessed the actions of the military. [86] Charges were brought against Total’s President Director General Thierry Desmarest and Director of On-Site Operations Herv Madeo for recruiting and paying battalions of the military and for promoting a situation of forced labour on the construction site. The court case came to an end in November 2005 with an out-of-court settlement for 5.2 million euros (US$6.12 million) despite Total still denying any direct or indirect responsibility for the situation and asserting that neither they nor any of their sub-contractors used forced labour. [87] The settlement terms include 10,000 euros (US$12,000) to each plaintiff on agreement that they drop the charges against Total, 1.2 million euros (US$1.32 million) for other victims who can verifiably prove that they were subject to forced labour on the pipeline project and a further 4 million euros (US$ 4.7 million) for development and humanitarian aid to Burmese refugees along the Thai border areas. [88] The allocation of the settlement money began in 2006 with the two larger sums being channelled through NGOs working in the Thai border regions. Initially Total encountered problems when two organisations refused to accept the funding. The Migrant Assistance Programme and the Thailand-Burma Border Consortium both declined the settlement money, citing Total’s ongoing business involvements with the Burmese regime and their previous involvement in forced labour as the reason. Jackie Pollock of the Migrants Assistance Programme stated that “It would be unethical to be funded by a company that has ignored human rights abuses.” [89] However, two other organisations: The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and the National Catholic Commission on Migration (NCCM), did agree to accept and distribute the financial aid. The UNHCR will spend the settlement money on aid projects in seven refugee camps in Thailand and the NCCM stated that it would use the funding to continue education and health projects in the Mon and Karen State areas. In addition the NCCM would also assist with the allocation of compensation to other victims of forced labour. They will manage a support fund for people subjected to forced labour for one week or more between 1995 and 1997 in southern Mon State and Tenasserim Division. [90] To receive the compensation the victims have to provide proof in the form of written or oral accounts which must be officially verified by a recognised international, regional or local organisation. By July 2006 Total’s lawyers were investigating 18 claims from victims in Kanbauk, Paukpinkwin and Yebyu Township. [91] Potential Use of Forced Labour on Internationally Sponsored Projects Throughout 2006 the Burmese junta conducted negotiations with many neighbouring governments and multinational corporations concerning future development and energy projects in the region. Several new projects also began during the year. As has been show in the past, development projects in Burma usually mean an increase in militarization in the surrounding areas, which then increases the prevalence of human rights abuses, particularly forced labour and portering. All of the following projects raise serious concerns regarding potential new human rights violations. Salween Dams In December 2005 the SPDC signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) to build a series of hydroelectric dams along the Salween River. Thailand has almost exhausted all of its domestic hydroelectric capability and is hugely dependent on foreign oil, so it is keen to secure energy deals with its neighbouring countries. It is estimated that Thailand will receive as much as 85-90 percent of the energy produced by the Burmese Salween dams. [92] Of the five proposed dam sites the two that seem to have the most developed plans are the Hat Gyi Dam in Karen State and the Tasang Dam in Shan State. [93] The Hat Gyi Dam is due to be completed first, work is scheduled to start in 2007 and the project should run for five to six years. However, the joint dam project is reportedly going ahead without social or environmental impact studies having been carried out. [94] The project has generated widespread criticism from environmental and human rights groups who claim that the dam will force thousands from their homes, depriving people of their livelihoods and that forced labour will be used by the military on the construction sites. [95] Whilst, there is a complex web of reasons behind the 2006 military offensives in Karen State, a direct link can be discerned between the offensives and proposed dam sites. “In terms of the offensives, this is quite clear,” said David Scott Mathieson, of Human Rights Watch. “The current offensives have to do with dams, as did the Shan forced relocation campaign between 1996 and 1998. The best way to (see) this is to place maps of proposed dam sites next to maps of the offensives and previous campaigns. The SPDC is clearing people away from development sites.” [96] According to KHRG, relocated people are being used to clear forest areas and build access roads to newly established SPDC camps in areas near the dam sites. [97] Increased militarization in the area has also resulted in villagers being conscripted to serve as guides and porters for the military, as well as labouring on their bases. [98] The terms of the MoU state that all information on the project is to remain confidential. This has angered many in Thailand, and throughout 2006 there were protests calling for the information to be made public. Reports have emerged from local NGOs that 10,000 refugees have already fled into the Mae Hong Son area in Thailand as a result of the dam project areas. [99] The exodus of villagers in the construction area was said to be prompted by the settlement of Burmese troops near a proposed reservoir for the Hat Gyi dam. [100] In March 2006 a group of Thai senators submitted an official letter to the Ministry of Energy demanding information on the project, as they became increasingly concerned about the negative impact of the dam on local communities. Still no information was made public, as the company asserted that they were unable to publicise anything without the permission of the SPDC. [101] On 19 September 2006, a military coup took place in Thailand and the government of Thaksin Shinawatra was removed from power. Thasksin’s government had previously developed a strong relationship with the Burmese junta including strengthening economic ties on projects such as the Salween dams. With a new regime in power, local environmental and human rights groups saw a renewed opportunity for a change in the relationship with Burma and began petitioning for an end to the dam projects. [102] In early November the new regime signalled that it intends to reassess its relations with Burma, particularly in the area of power generation. The new Energy Minister Piyasvasti Amranand stated that they may possibly abandon the Salween dam projects; however, many observers believe that at least two of the five dam projects (Hat Gyi and Tasang) may be considered too far advanced to back out of. [103] When completed, the proposed Tasang Dam in Shan State will be the tallest hydroelectric dam in South East Asia, measuring 228 meters high with a generating capacity of over 7,000 megawatts. The project is estimated to cost US$6 billion and take 15 years. In April 2006 the Burmese regime signed a Memorandum of Agreement with the Thai company MDX to build the dam. [104] The flood plain is expected to cover hundreds of kilometres which will mean the displacement of thousands of people. The Shan Sapawa Organisation reported in September 2006 that over 60,000 had already been forcibly relocated from the flood zone and that MDX were building roads, staff buildings and other facilities in the area. Due to conflict in the region the SPDC military has tripled the number of battalions in the area, increasing the corollary risk of human rights abuses and forced labour. [105] Shwe Gas Development In August 2000 the Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE) signed a deal with the South Korean multinational Daewoo International to explore and develop natural gas fields in the Bay of Bengal, off the coast of Arakan State. In 2004 they announced the discovery of a large off-shore gas field containing several blocks of gas. The largest lock being A-1 is estimated to contain upwards of 3 trillion cubic feet of gas. The subsequent development project was named “Shwe” which means gold in Burmese. [106] The estimated market value of the A-1 block alone is US$80 billion. The Shwe Gas Consortium was set up to oversee the development of the project. Consortium members include Daewoo International with a 60 percent share, the Korean Gas Corporation with 10 percent, India’s Oil and Natural Gas Corporation with 10 percent and the Gas Authority of India (GAIL) with a 20 percent share. The gas field is thought to have a lifetime of around 20 years and it has been estimated that the project will increase the junta’s income by 150 percent, bringing in between US$580 and US$824 million each year, or up to US$17 billion over the life of the project. [107]
The Shwe Gas Movement, a coalition of NGOs, is calling on the Consortium members to cease cooperation with the Burmese regime as the gas revenues from the project will only strengthen the junta’s oppressive control of the country and allow for further development of the military. “The hopes of many people in Burma for democratic change will be dealt a serious blow by the Shwe gas project if it goes ahead,” said Wong Aung, coordinator of the Shwe Gas Movement in Thailand. [108] Daewoo have stated that they will not withdraw from the project and that “it is not the right time to discuss a human rights abuse issue because we are…yet to begin development”. [109] Previous gas deals have been directly linked to arms purchases by the junta. [110] At the end of 2006, 14 Daewoo International executives were indicted in South Korea for violations of international trading law and technology development facilitating law, for illegally exporting gunnery production factory, equipments, and technical skills to the Burmese military regime. [111] The Gas from the A-1 field was initially earmarked for Indian consumption which would mean building a pipeline overland through Arakan and Chin States, then through Bangladesh to India. However during bilateral negotiations between India and Bangladesh, the latter imposed conditions on any pipeline agreement including access for commodities and energy from Bangladesh to Nepal and Bhutan through Indian territory. India could not agree to the conditions so the project stalled. On 7 December 2005 the Burmese Junta and the Consortium unexpectedly signed a MoU with PetroChina, a private oil and gas company from Beijing, to supply gas from the A-1 field, including an overland pipeline to China. The route of the proposed pipeline will stretch from Taungup Township to Mindon, then through Shan State and into Yunnan in China. [112] In January 2006 Burmese officials confirmed that despite the deal with China, they could still supply gas to India but it would have to be from block A-2 which being further out would require an additional 150km of pipeline. [113] Daewoo International also continued to explore the A-3 block which is estimated to carry reserves worth around US$4 billion. In April 2006 they sold 20 percent of the development rights to India’s Oil and Natural Gas Corp. [114] By August 2006, GAIL had completed a feasibility study on the construction of a 1,400 kilometre pipeline, by passing Bangladesh, running through Arakan and Chin States along the Kaladan River to Gaya in Bihar via Mizoram State of India. [115] The Shwe Gas Movement reported that the SPDC military, in charge of protecting the project, had already begun building 15 new army bases along the proposed pipeline route. The military has reportedly used forced labour to build these bases, as well as in the construction of roads in the area. Forced relocations have also reportedly increased along the proposed route. Following previous experiences on the Yadana and Yetagun pipelines, the concern is that when the project begins, the number of human rights violations will increase. [116] Road and Rail Projects In 2006, the SPDC was a partner in ‘The Asian Highway’, an inter-governmental project which aims to connect 32 countries throughout Asia, and has been organised in partnership with the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP). Within Burma one section already under construction is intended to run from Thailand via the border town of Myawaddy in Pa-an District, continuing north to Rangoon, through Thaton District. The DKBA has been charged by the SPDC with implementing the construction of the Highway in Thaton District. In doing so, the DKBA have in turn forcibly relocated villagers, and forced local residents to clear the land, dig irrigation trenches and build bridges. KHRG have asserted that “similar destruction can be expected along the Asian Highway’s entire route through Burma”. [117] Throughout 2006 negotiations continued between the Bangladeshi government and the Burmese junta on the construction of a “friendship road” which would connect the two countries. The proposed 153 km route would stretch from Taungbro to Kyauktaw in Burma via Ramu-Gundom to Cox’s Bazaar in Bangladesh. [118] In January 2006 the government of India announced that plans to construct a railway link with Burma were to go ahead. On the Indian side the proposed rail route will cover 98km from Manipur State to the Indo-Burma border. The junta will construct a further 130km via Kalaymyo to Mandalay. [119]
1.4 Forced Portering – Partial List of Incidents for 2006 Arakan State Buthidaung Township On 26 January 2006, it was reported that civilians were forced to carry goods and commodities from Taung Baza market to Sai Din Army Camp where at least three SPDC battalions were stationed. The distance between Taung Baza market and Sai Din Army Camp is 23 miles (more than 38 kilometres) and it takes at least seven hours on foot each way. The porters were forced to carry army rations including rice, peanuts, cooking oil and fuel including diesel. Villagers reported that if a family refused they were fined at least 500 kyat. The army also forced people to work as sentries at night, especially in villages close to the Bangladesh border. Twenty to 30 persons from each of the following villages were forced to work as porters on a rotational basis:
Chin State Matupi Township On 8 January 2006, troops from LIB #30 arrived at Satu village, and stopped a Sunday church service in order to commandeer 20 persons to porter for their unit. The church president, Mr. Vansen, was given an hour to select 20 people. Those who subsequently portered for the SPDC troops included 2 church elders, and a 15 year old girl called Ma Yin. [121] On 10 October 2006, it was reported that Major Aung Lin Thwat, and troops from LIB #16 camped in Sabawngte village forced villagers from the surrounding area of Chin State to carry their supplies. The soldiers called up seven villagers from Sabawngte and forced them to carry backpacks and rations to the military camp in Darling Village. The goods carried by each villager weighed around 12 kilograms. [122] Karen State Dooplaya District In August 2006, two soldiers deserted SPDC LIB #308 after being accused of rape. They were later captured, and as punishment for deserting and stealing a pistol they were used as porters to carry ammunition and rations during an offensive against the KNU, 25 km west of Three Pagodas Pass, along the Thai border. One of the soldiers died while portering and the fate of the second is unknown. [123] Mergui/Tavoy District On 20 September 2006, troops from SPDC LIB #558 ordered villagers living in Ta-nin-tha-yi Township to transport food supplies for SPDC IB #24 in the Moe-taw area. Villagers required for this task were: Thee-daw village, 80 persons; Ta-gu village, 80 persons; and Thay-baw-na village, 50 persons. [124] Nyaunglebin District On 28 April 2006, it was reported that TOC #1 Commander Thin Aung, had ordered the forced employment of 2,000 villagers from the Kler La/Baw Ga Lyi Gyi area, Mone Township, in the portering of food supplies, as part of a major re supply of camps on the Kler La- Busakee road; including Naw Soe, Busakee and They Mu Ko camps. [126] On 11 May 2006, it was reported that the SPDC had been forcing villagers in Shwegyin Township to work as forced porterers during their offensive. For three months, villagers and bullock carts from Donzayit, Salu Chaung, Kyunchaung, and other villages in Shwegyin Township were commandeered to transport food supplies to the frontline and transport SPDC troops back to Shwegyin and military hospitals. As a result, farmers were largely impeded from sustaining their own livelihoods. [127] On 5 July 2006, SPDC IB #57 Commander Min Kyaing Thant commandeered 90 bullock carts from Pa-deh-gon village Tract and 150 carts from Ma-bee village Tract, with 3 persons per cart, to carry the battalion’s food supplies. Despite villagers’ protestations that they were unable to go due to heavy flooding, they were refused the option to decline. [128] On 15 August 2006, SPDC LIB #599 troops ordered Maladaw villager Maung Ro to carry durian fruits from Wah-khee to Maladaw. [129] Thaton District In early 2006, DKBA Battalion #333 Commander Boh Lweh shot 25 year old Saw B--- 30 times in the head with a slingshot before demanding he porter for their battalion. [130]
On 16 February 2006, a DKBA unit in Bilin Township forced the Kaw-heh village head, Par Noe, and fellow villager, Par Na Da, to serve as porters for a month, under the justification that they had connections with KNU solders. If they refused, they were told that they would instead be sent to prison for the month. [131] On 11 February 2006, Captain Aye Aung with 60 of his soldiers from LIB #104 entered E--- village, Pa’an Township, and ordered the village head to find him four guides. Once they left the village the guides were also forced to porter for the battalion, with each villager having to carry loads weighing around 24 kgs. When they reached the next village the troops again demanded guides from the village head and released the E--- villagers. [132] On 21 February 2006, Captain Than Htun along with 40 soldiers from DKBA Headquarters Security Battalion came to P--- village, Pa’an Township, and ordered the village head to find him 13 porters. The 13 villagers were forced to serve the battalion as porters for three days. [133] On 23 February 2006, Captain Than Htun along with 40 soldiers from DKBA Headquarters Security Battalion entered K--- village, Pa’an Township while the villagers were worshipping. They captured all of the men and took six of them as porters, only releasing them two days later. [134] In March 2006, DKBA troops apprehended Poe Choh, of Gk’Wah Htah village, Bilin Township who had been staying in Dtah Meh Kee village. They forced him to serve as a porter, during which time he was assaulted by the troops. [135] In June 2006, DKBA Brigade #333 troops, under the command of Mo Kyo, began operations in Bilin Township. From this time on through to through to the end of 2006, troops have frequently entered villages demanding information and porters, threatening that anyone caught fleeing from portering duty would be fined 300,000 kyat. [136] On 11 June 2006, DKBA troops under Hla Maung forced 17 residents of Ta-eu-ni village, Bilin Township to serve as porters for their unit. [137] Toungoo District On 4 February 2006, troops from SPDC LIB #440, based at Kaw-thay-doe camp in Tantabin Township, forced 4 men and 7 women from Kaw-thay-doe village to carry 3 sacks of rice to Naw-soe and then on to Kaw-thay-doe camp. [138] On 24 February 2006, SPDC TOC #663 Commander Tin Aung, based at Play-hsa-lo camp, Tantabin Township, forced 5 Play-hsa-lo villagers and one Yar-lo villager to carry army rations from Htee-lo to Play-hsa-lo. [139] On 27 February 2006, Major Aye Lwin of LIB #6, in Thandaung Township, forced villagers of Htee-tha-saw and Ka-mi-lo to carry rations comprising of:
On 3 March 2006, LID #66, TOC #3, under Commander Tin Aung, made 70 bullock carts from Za Ya Gyi take rice from Za Ya Gyi to Hti Loh. [141] On 9 March 2006, SPDC TOC #663 Commander Tin Aung forced 10 Play-Hsa-Loh villagers to transport rice from Hti Loh back to Play-Hsa-Loh. [142] On 11 March 2006, the SPDC TOC #663 Commander Tin Aung, based at Play-Hsa-Lo camp in Tantabin Township, forced Ya-lo and Plaw-baw-doe villagers to carry army rations from Paw-per-lay-la to Play-hsa-lo. The victims from Ya-lo village were:
And Plaw-baw-doe villagers:
Also on 11 March 2006, SPDC LID #66 Commander Khin Zaw Oo, based at Kler-lar (Baw-ga-li-gyi) in Tantabin Township, ordered all the truck owners in Kler-lar (Baw-ga-li-gyi) and Kaw-thay-doe areas to transport army rations from Pa-let-wa to Kler-lar (Baw-ga-li-gyi). [144] On 12 March 2006, in Tantabin Township, SPDC TOC #3, IB #35, Column #2 Commander Bo Nay Myo, based at Klaw-mee-doe, forced: 8 women and 22 men from Ler-ka-doe, 10 women and 17 men from Hu-mu-doe and 18 women and 60 men from Klaw-mee-doe villages to carry army rations from Paletwa to Klaw-mee-doe army camp, for the next three days. [145] Also on 12 March 2006, SPDC TOC #663 Commander Tin Aung, in Tantabin Township, forced 9 Yer-lo villagers, 9 Paw-per villagers, 8 Ka-mu-lo villagers and 5 women and 13 men from Play-hsa-lo village to carry army rations from Lay-lar-taw to Play-hsa-lo army camp. [146] On 17 March 2006, LIB #108 troops, in Tantabin Township, forced Htee-lo villagers to carry army rations from Htee-lo to Play-hsa-lo army camp. [147] On 18 March 2006, SPDC troops from Play-hsa-lo camp under TOC #663 of LID #66, led by Commander Tin Aung forced 16 villagers from Play-hsa-lo, 9 from Yu-lo, 2 from Por-pa and 3 from Yeh-lo to carry their rations and ammunition from Nart-kyar area to Play-hsa-lo army camp. [148] On 18 March 2006, SPDC troops from LIB #11 led by Bo Han Moe Aung, forced 15 villagers from Khaw-law-kar village, 15 from S’bar-law-khee and 15 from Khu-thay-doe to carry their rations and ammunition to Khu-thay-dar army camp. [149] On 3 April 2006, the SPDC military forced villagers from Ger Mu Loh to go to Hti Lo, pick up rations of rice and take it back to Play Hsa Loh camp. The villagers were:
On 13 May 2006, troops from SPDC LIB #108 under LID #66 forced 6 residents of Ye-tho-gyi village, Tantabin Township, to transport army rations from Ye-tho-gyi to Ku-leh-doe army camp. [151] On 20 May 2006, LID #66 Commander Khin Zaw forced the residents of 10 villages in Baw-ga-li-gyi village tract, a total of 350 villagers, to transport 200 sacks of rice to Naw-soe military camp. [152] On 6 June 2006, troops from SPDC TOC #2 of MOC #16, led by Major Ko Ko Kyi, forced 72 villagers from Play-hsa-lo, Yeh-lo, Plaw-baw-doe, Ta-pa-khee, Mwee-lo, Paw-pa and Lay-wor-lo villages to carry their army supplies from Htee-lo camp to Tain-pu camp. [153] On 5 July 2006, SPDC TOC #661 ordered villagers from the west bank of Thauk-ye-khat River to carry food supplies from Thandaung town to Tahuk-ye-khat river suspension bridge camp. The villages included in this order were:
On 6 August 2006, SPDC MOC #16, TOC #2, IB #241 and Southern Command attempted to capture 700 villagers in Tha Bin Nyut to carry food for the SPDC soldiers from Play Hsa Lo camp. [155] On 15 August 2006, SPDC LIB #10 forced 10 villagers to carry food from Kaw Thay Der (Ye Tho Gyi) to Noe Soe (Mong Di Gyi) camp. [156] On 15 August 2006, SPDC TOC #662 troops forced 6 Der-kah villagers and 13 Htee-pu-khee-der-kho villagers to carry food supplies from Waw-gyi camp to Ka-ya-khee camp. [157] On 19 August 2006, SPDC LIB #439 commanded by Kyaw Htun Win from Shasibo Camp forced 16 villagers to carry food to Hti Lo Camp. [158] On 23 August 2006, SPDC IB #35 battalion commander ordered the following groups of villagers to carry food supplies for the army: Ker-weh village, 40 persons; Ler-gi-kho-doe-ka village, 15 persons; Ler-gi-kho-doe-kho village, 30 persons; Ku-thay-doe village, 30 persons; Sa-ba-ler-khee village, 15 persons; and Kaw-law-ka village, 15 persons. [159] On 21 September 2006, SPDC MOC #16, based at Teik-pu camp, seized 59 villagers of Teik-pu village, taking them to Tha-byay-nyunt to carry food supplies. [160]
On 2 October 2006, Commander Aung Min of SPDC IB #1, based in Maung Ko Der camp, forced 35 villagers to carry their food rations for them. [161] On 4 October 2006, Bo Zaw Win of SPDC LIB #5 ordered 8 men and 12 women of Ler-gi-kho village and 30 men of Kher-weh villager to carry food supplies from Thandaung to Kher-weh camp. [162] Also on 4 October 2006, SPDC LID #66 Commander Maung Maung Aye, ordered Bawgali-gyi villager Po Pyu to transport bamboo cut by Kaw-thay-doe villagers to Bawgali-gyi. [163] On 7 October 2006, Commander Kyaw Tun Win of LIB #439 forced 8 Shasibo villagers to carry rice to Hti Lo Camp. [164] On 18 October 2006, Major Zaw Min of SPDC IB #1 based at Maw-koe-doe camp, ordered 6 Peh-kaw-doe villagers to carry food supplies from Baw-gali-gyi to Maw-koe-doe camp. [165] On 21 October 2006, SPDC IB #580, based at Play-hsa-lo camp, Tantabin Township, ordered 42 villagers from Play-hsa-lo, Ler-lo, Plaw-baw-doe, Paw-pa and Ka-nue-lo villages, to carry military supplies from Tha-bye-nyunt camp to Play-hsa-lo camp. [166] On 21 October 2006, SPDC LID #66, TOC 662, IB #11, under Commander Aung Min forced 12 Beh Kaw Der villagers to carry supplies from Kler La to Maung Ko Der camp. Commander Maung Maung Aye, based in Kler La camp, also forced villagers to carry food from Kler La to Busakee. [167]
On 30 November 2006, LIB #590 ordered 20 villagers and 6 ox cart owners from Mae Ta Taw, Myaw Oo, Paw Pi Der, Aung Chan Tha and Htee To Lo villages to carry food supplies from Ye Oh Sin to the Htee La Baw Hta army camp. [169] On 5 December 2006, LID #66 Commander Maung Maung Aye, ordered LIB #6 Battalion Commander Aung Soe Win to send 35 people from Kaw Thay Der village to carry army supplies from Kaw Thay Der to Naw Soe. They were subsequently ordered to carry supplies from Naw Soe camp back to Baw Ga Li Gyi camp. On the same day General Maung Maung Aye ordered villagers from Wa Thee Ko to cut 300 pieces of bamboo and take them to Wa Thee Ko for the construction of the camp. [170] Mon State Ye Township On 8 January 2006, two soldiers deserted from SPDC IB #31, based in Khaw Zar sub-Town, and reportedly joined a Mon rebel group operating in the area. As a result, SPDC forces began threatening the people of Mi-Htaw-Hlar Kyi village and forced six villagers, on a rotational basis, to patrol the village and act as porters to track down the deserters. “Our villagers are being used as porters to track down the deserters. At least two or three men were used and they had to carry supplies for the soldiers. Sometimes we were used for four days,” one villager explained. [171] Shan State Kae-See Township On 5 February 2006, a patrol of about 30 SPDC troops from Nam-Zarng based LIB #543 conscripted 4 villagers from Nawng Wo village in Wan Zing village tract, Kae-See Township, to serve as porters. The villagers were forced to carry heavy loads whilst on patrol with the troops. One porter escaped into the jungle, and the load was divided into 3 portions. After four days, the 3 porters were released at Wan Yurng village, and replaced with villagers from Wan Yurng. [172] Murng Kerng Township In September 2006, it was reported that villages in Murng Khun village tract had to provide at least 1 person each day to go to each of the two local SPDC military camps; the Murng-Kerng-based LIB #514 to the south and the Kae-See-based IB #286 to the northeast, to be ready to serve as military porters if and when required; which was said to be frequently. If villagers escaped, their whole village was liable to punishment, often paying a fine in the form of livestock. Villagers of Nawng Kio, Wan Paang and Ta Saa Le villages in Murng Khun tract said that the arrangement had been in place for many years. [173] Murng-Nai Township On 28 April 2006, SPDC troops from LIB #576, under Capt. Thein Htun Oo, forced 4 villagers of Pa Sa village in Nawng Hee village tract, to serve as porters for 6 days, seriously injuring their shoulders as a result of the heavy loads they were required to carry. The four villagers were:
Namkhan Township On 4 January 2006, it was reported that during battles with the Shan State Army-South in the area three miles from Namkhan, the SPDC military had forced 20 people from each surrounding village to act as porters during the day and to work as sentries during the night. At night they were forced to stand guard along the Namkhan-Namphatkar road and at the ferry ports on the Shweli River. [175] Nam-Zarng Township On 19 June 2006, a patrol from SPDC LIB #516 conscripted 3 villagers from Tin Paet village, Nawng Hee village tract, to serve as the patrol’s guides. The 3 male villagers were: Zaai Kyan, aged 37; Zaai Sa, aged 20; and Kaw-Ling, aged 30. Once they left the village, two of the men were forced to porter cooking utensils for the patrol. After three days of patrol, they were interrogated about the movements of Shan soldiers in the area, during which time they were assaulted, and cruelly tortured, with burning plastic sheet dripped on their head. The following day, a Pa-O ceasefire group negotiated for the release of the villagers, who were threatened with death if they informed anybody what had happened. [176]
1.5 Forced Labour – Partial List of Incidents for 2006 Arakan State In February 2006, The Arakan Liberation Army burned a temporary SPDC Army camp. In response, SPDC troops accused local villagers of being rebels, demanded 80,000 kyat as compensation, and forced the villagers to rebuild the camp. [177] On 9 May 2006, it was reported that villagers from Kyaukpan Du, Thawin Chaung, Inndin, and Mrin Lwet in Maungdaw Township, as well as Atwin Byin, Chut Byin, Owe Thima, Thein Daung and Taungmaw in Buthidaung and Rathidaung Townships, were being forced to construct an 18 mile road between a ‘model’ village for Buddhist settlers in Rathidaung Township and a border village in Maungdaw Township. Whilst local authorities promised to pay the villagers 500 kyat for each days work they later refused to honour their promise. [178] Buthidaung Township From January 2006 to at least the time of this report on 8 May 2006, NaSaKa, Burma’s Border Security Force in western Burma, forced villagers into providing free labour for road construction projects in Buthidaung Township, Arakan State. The road which is being constructed by villagers will connect the MOC #15 of Dabru Chaung to Thin Ga Net IB #552. It is 14 miles long, 30 feet wide and 4 feet high. Villagers recruited for the construction of the road came from:
On 8 January 2006, it was reported that large numbers of Rohingya villagers were being forced to perform sentry duty at night in areas of northern Arakan. Numerous sentry posts were built on the back of forced labour. Six Rohingya were required to man each sentry post for the entire night, meaning that at least 78 villagers had to do sentry duty from each village everyday. Villagers had to stay awake the whole night and keep shouting and asking again and again “Hey! Who are you?” whether they saw anyone or not. Two or three times in every week, soldiers, NaSaKa or the police would come to the villages to check whether the sentries were on duty and awake. Perversely, the sentries were punished for both shouting when they visited and again for not shouting. [180] On 18 March 2006, The TOC office in Buthidaung Town ordered IB #234 to complete the construction of a three-kilometre stretch of road in Tat Min Chaung and Min Gyi Taung within 30 days. The TOC required the road to be 18 feet in width and 2.5 feet high. Every family in Maung Gyi Taung, Lat Wat Dad Pazung Chaung, Min Gyi Zay, Dar Bine Sara, Tatmin Chaung and Shari Gona villages had to send one person as a ‘volunteer’ for the construction work. The military warned villagers not to divulge the fact that they were being used as forced labour, rather they were asked to identify themselves as volunteer workers. [181] On 5 May 2006, Abu Sayed, 50 years old, from Nan Yah Gone village, Buthidaung Township was detained for three days in an army camp and fined 10,000 kyat for his refusal to work as a forced labourer. [182] On 14 May 2006, it was reported that villagers in northern Buthidaung Township, were being forced to lay a road by the military authorities. The road constructed by villagers connected Taung Bazar to Bow Gawli village. It was required to be 8 miles in length, 80 feet wide and 3.75 feet high. Villagers used as forced labour were from nearby village tracts such as:
On 15 June 2006, at about 7:30 am, a seven-member police team from Taung Bazaar police station went to the Gyi Nuk Thi village tract, accompanied by the VPDC Chairman U Maung Hlun Chay, and arrested seven people from the village to provide forced labour. However, four of them were later released on the recommendation of the VPDC Chairman. Among the police personnel was San Tun, the Sergeant of Taung Bazar police station. The three Rohingya detained were Ali Hossain, 40, Mohamed Sayed, 35, and Kairul Amin, 19, who were forced to work in the police camp till sun set without food or wages. Kairul Amin fell unconscious as a result of the heat and lack of food, only to be assaulted and accused of feigning his exhaustion. The three men were released the following day after having no charges brought against them. [184] On 15 October 2006, Zamal Uddin, a Rohingya villager from Gufi village, Buthidaung Township, was accosted by NaSaKa forces whilst on his way to market. He was taken to their camp where he was forced to work alongside other Rohin |
