HRDU Yearbook 2006 | Chapter 8: Ethnic Minority Rights

Before the British occupation and annexation of the Burmese territories, the area we know as Burma today was a series of autonomous indigenous nations. Many ethnic groups were separated by geographical boundaries such as steep mountains and wide rivers, resulting in sharp linguistic divides and a large number of distinct ethnic groups in a small territory. Burma officially has over 134 different ethnic groups, speaking more than 100 distinct languages and dialects. (See Section 8.5: Official List of Ethnic Minority Groups in Burma). Approximately 68 percent of the population belongs to the predominantly Buddhist Burman ethnic group, over 20 million people, or approximately 32 percent of the total population belong to an ethnic minority group. Although all together, they occupy approximately 55% of the land in Burma, this land is mainly located along the border regions. The geographical marginalization of the ethnic minorities of Burma is also paralleled in the country’s politics and history.

For the purposes of Colonial administration, Burma was divided into two zones: the centrally located “Ministerial Burma”, a predominantly Burman region, and the “Frontier Areas”, located in the mountainous regions situated along Burma's present-day international borders where most of the ethnic minorities were based. On one hand, the local systems of governance in Ministerial Burma were destroyed. The British imposed their own administration and system of governance in the area. However, they also invested resources there. While the Frontier Areas retained their systems of governance and some autonomy, they were exploited by the British for their natural resources and given very little in return, particularly in terms of health, education, economic development, or political voice at the national level. [1] This legacy endures to this day.

Burma had some indication that independence would be forthcoming from Britain and a number of Burman leaders and leaders from various key ethnic groups made preparations for the new nation in advance. Perhaps the most important document to lay the foundations for the new nation was the Panglong Agreement; signed by General Aung San, a prominent Buman leader, and Chin, Kachin and Shan leaders. For General Aung San,

The Panglong Agreement was the key document in attempting to build this unified nation and in creating a federal Burma. The constitution which emerged after Britain granted Burma independence on 4 January 1948 fell short of the expectations of many. The territories of four ethnic groups, the Karen, Karenni, Shan and Kachin, were recognized and each was designated a separate state. Each recognized ethnic group was represented at the national level and two groups, the Shan and the Karenni, were allowed the choice to succeed after 10 years. Other groups, however, continued to feel marginalized. Perhaps these issues could have been resolved in the Chamber of Nationalities, had the Federal Union of Burma been given a fair chance. However, a military regime took power in 1962 and the new constitution in 1974 stripped all ethnic minority groups equally of any autonomy. (For more information, see the Historical Background).

Fast-forward to the present: over the past decade, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) has come under increasing international attention, particularly due to its treatment of ethnic minorities, but also due to its non-democratic rule, the continued detention of Aung San Suu Kyi, economic mismanagement and its effect on the region, particularly in regards to the spread of HIV/AIDS and illegal drugs. In an apparent attempt to deflect some of this international criticism and regain some international credibility, particularly in the eyes of their fellow members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and United Nations (UN) officials, in 2005 the SPDC launched its “Seven-Point Roadmap to Democracy” and resumed the National Convention and the constitution drafting process. The National Convention (NC) had been operating since 1993 but was often suspended until it finally adjourned in 1996, having accomplished very little and certainly nothing concretely democratic. [3] The resumption of the National Convention is not the first time the SPDC has used the NC and the pretence of democratic principles to assuage international condemnation. The NC was last revived in 2004, following the Depayin massacres. Only ethnic minorities who had signed ceasefire agreements with the SPDC were invited and their concerns were not allowed on the agenda. Delegates were only permitted to discuss the agenda that was set by the SPDC and discussion of any matters outside this agenda was not tolerated. (For more information on the National Convention, see Chapter 11: Freedom of Opinion, Expression and the Press).

Prior to NC sessions in 2005, the SPDC arrested leaders of several ethnic groups and increased military offensives in the border areas. [4] Before the Convention opened for the year, the leaders of 11 ethnic political groups had signed a statement indicating their lack of faith in the NC process. There were two sessions of the NC in 2005 and during both, it was expected that representatives from ethnic political parties under ceasefire agreements would be present and remain silent, following the SPDC’s prearranged agenda. The SPDC arranged for rallies in support of the NC, threatening civilians with fines for failure to attend. [5] In response an Ethnic Nationalities Conference was held in 2005 to commence work on drafting an alternative constitution.

There have been a number of meetings to draft alternative constitutions over the years, particularly along the Thai-Burma Border. In 2006, the Federal Constitution Drafting and Coordinating Committee (FCDCC) put out a draft of a Federal Constitution. The FCDCC is made up of MPs, and other members of the Burmese democracy movement in exile, including representatives of women and youth groups. The seminar for the draft constitution was held in territory controlled by the Karen National Union (KNU) in Karen State. The draft of the Federal constitution contained 14 chapters and 197 articles and was designed to build democracy in Burma through a genuine federal system. In addition, the National Reconciliation Program (NRP) has been helping ethnic groups draft their own state constitutions in the event that federalism is realised in Burma. Arakan, Chin, Kachin, Karen, Karenni, Mon and Shan groups have reportedly commenced work on the drafting process. [6] In July 2006, the Chin Community in Germany (CCG), and the Chin Forum, organized the Chinland Constitution Consultative Meetings in Frankfurt. Over 100 representatives attended including guests from Germany, Thailand, the United States, Sweden, India, Canada and Japan. One of the main issues discussed was the fifth draft of the Chinland Constitution. [7]

National Convention proceedings in 2006 followed the same pattern as previous years. The SPDC ‘invited’ several ethnic groups and exerted pressure for them to attend so they could show the international community they had the support of the ethnic minority groups. Ironically, some of the delegates chosen did not even have the support of their own ethnic groups. For instance, P’Doh Aung San, a former member of the KNU who has not only faced numerous allegations of corruption, but has also been implicated as having been closely involved with the Dam Byan Byaut Kya (Guerrilla Retaliation Units) execution squads, was invited as a representative of the Karen ethnic minority. [8] Needless to say, very few Karen support Aung San and he cannot be considered representative of the Karen people.

Meanwhile, those who did partake in the NC were barred from contributing anything of substance. In 2006, the NC worked on drafting a new constitution, though many groups gave up any hope of a democratic constitution emerging from it, let alone one that responds to the needs of the ethnic minorities. Ethnic leaders and international actors, most of whom have dismissed the NC as a sham, continued to call on the SPDC to engage in tripartite dialogue with members of the National League for Democracy (NLD) and ethnic minority groups but there was no move in this direction by the SPDC in 2006.

The SPDC’s attempts to placate the international community with the democratic motions of the National Convention seem to have failed. In September 2006, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) voted to have the issue of Burma placed on the permanent agenda. The SPDC protested, as did long-time supporters of the regime, China and Russia. In an effort to appear to have the support of both the government and the opposition, the SPDC demanded that ceasefire groups also issue formal protests to the UNSC resolution. The SPDC exerted pressure, often in the form of direct violence, against those ceasefire groups who refused to make such international statements and even went so far as to fabricate new groups to bolster the appearance of having the support of the country’s ethnic minority groups. For instance, on 7 October 2006, the “Rakhaing Peace Organization” (RPO) published a statement opposing the debate of Burma in the UNSC. The signature on the statement was that of Saw Tun Oo, the former chairman of the Communist Party of Burma in Arakan State (CPB-Arakan) who surrendered to the junta in 1997. [9] It would thus seem that Saw Tun Oo acted at the behest of the SPDC.

The groundwork for armed ethnic resistance was first laid by the British during World War II. The British used various ethnic groups in their campaign against the Japanese in the region, giving many groups their first formal military training. Ethnic minority groups were preferred for recruitment into the British armed forces, especially the Karen, Kachin and the Chin and it could be said that some of these groups never fully disarmed following the War.

When Burma was granted independence in 1948, the political structures they left in place left a bad taste in the mouths of many. The Karen ethnic group, who had been fiercely loyal to the British during the War, were among those disappointed. They had expected a reward for their loyalty; a reward that was never conferred. Thus the Karen’s resistance began shortly afterwards. Certain other ethnic groups initially only began organising in order to defend their interests in the newly independent state and they only became militarised following the military coup in 1962.

The Burmese military regime has adopted a number of strategies to deal with these groups over the years. One such strategy, reportedly devised in the mid-1960’s but not employed until the early-70’s in the Shwegyin hills of Karen State, was dubbed the ‘Four Cuts Policy’ (Pya Ley Pya in Burmese). [10] The four ‘cuts’ are said to cut off all lines of supply of food, funds, recruits, and intelligence to resistance groups from their supposed civilian support base. The direct and immediate result of this policy was state-directed violence against the civilian population. The SPDC has continued to employ the Four Cuts Policy as its principle instrument in its ongoing struggle against resistance groups. However, while the Four Cuts Policy was initially conceived to undermine armed resistance groups, the same tactics are still being employed, not to weaken insurgent groups, but rather to dominate and exploit the civilian population.

Throughout this report, and all previous editions of the Burma Human Rights Yearbook (and indeed the vast majority of other reports documenting human rights abuses perpetrated in Burma), this state-directed violence has been categorized thematically, however, it must be noted that these abuses are by no means discrete. It needs to be remembered that many of these abuses are closely related. For instance, forced relocation is intimately linked with forced labour, extortion, destruction of property, deprivation of livelihood and the denial of fundamental freedoms. By way of example: remote ethnic villages that are situated in areas beyond direct SPDC-control are often forcibly relocated by SPDC army units to areas that can effectively be controlled by the military. Once relocated into SPDC-administered relocation sites, these villagers are regularly exploited as forced labour and as a source of extortion. Their former villages are typically burned to the ground or sewn with landmines. Many are denied permission to return to their fields and plantations and are thus not only denied the freedom of movement but are also deprived of their livelihoods. For the purposes of clarity and ease of understanding, these abuses have been dealt with separately throughout this report, though the web-like and inter-related nature of human rights abuses in Burma must be kept in mind. Regardless of whether the regime employs direct violence, indirect economic deprivation or strategies of cultural assimilation, their effects remain the same: the repression of ethnic minority villagers and the manipulation and destruction of ethnic identity.

Public services to ethnic minority areas, such as health and education, are the lowest priority in a country which does not prioritise health and education at all. (For more information, see Chapter 9: Rights to Education and Health). For those who can withstand the economic pressures, the SPDC continues to enact laws and policies aimed at denying ethnic groups the rights of cultural expression and assimilating them into the mainstream Burman Buddhist culture. (For more information, see Chapter 10: Freedom of Belief and Religion). Economic and infrastructure development in ethnic minority areas almost invariably benefits the junta far more than it does the minorities living in those areas. In many cases, such development projects are conducted to the detriment of local peoples. (For more information, see Chapter 5: Deprivation of Livelihood).

Employing their strategy of divide and rule, the regime has actively encouraged minority groups to compete amongst themselves for available resources. In 1989, the former head of Military Intelligence, General Khin Nyunt began exploiting this advantage by offering ceasefire agreements to various armed ethnic resistance groups. The so-called ‘ceasefire groups’ are permitted to retain their arms but enter truce agreements with the regime whereby both parties agree to cease hostilities against one another. However, these agreements do not extend to cover the civilian population that happens to live in those areas, and the SPDC continues to use violence against them, often with the complicity, and in some cases, the assistance of the newly formed ceasefire group. To sweeten the deal further, the ceasefire groups are offered certain economic concessions and permitted some degree of limited autonomy within territories they are granted authority to control. However, no ceasefire agreement in Burma's recent history has ever led to a political settlement, and in the majority of cases, the ceasefire groups quickly adopt the same practices employed by the SPDC and also commit widespread human rights violations against the very people whom they claim to represent. For example, in Thaton District of Karen State, local Karen villagers have reported that they suffer far worse abuses at the hands of the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), who entered into a ceasefire pact with the regime in 1994. [11]

The SPDC maintains that as many as 17 armed ethnic groups have forged ceasefire agreements and "returned to the legal fold". However, a number of these pacts have broken down and some of these groups have once again taken up arms against the regime. Perhaps the most striking example of this was the March 1995 ceasefire agreement between the SPDC and the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) which the SPDC violated within three months with fresh attacks in June 1995. By December that same year, the KNPP announced that they considered the ceasefire null and void. (For more information, see Section 8.6: Ceasefire Status of Ethnic Groups).

Please note that the pages which follow do not represent an exhaustive list of ethnic ceasefire and ethnic resistance armies. The list includes only some of the major and more influential groups or those that were active during 2006.

The Arakan Liberation Army (ALA) is the military arm of the Arakan Liberation Party (ALP) and has been fighting the regime since 1968. On 22 October 2006, ALA troops opened fire on and burnt down the SPDC army camp manned by Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) #55 in Paletwa, Chin State while troops were away from the camp on patrol. There were no casualties. However, as a result, the SPDC troops harassed and interrogated nearby villagers. Villagers in the region are also worried that when the army rebuilds their camp, they will be called upon to supply forced labour. [12]

On 13 December 2006, ALA blockaded the road connecting Paletwa in Chin State to India’s border. One trader heard that the ALP would shoot anyone who tried to use the road. In response, the SPDC set up their own roadblock, promising to stop traffic on the road for a longer period. SPDC army troops stationed in the Shinletwa army camp in Paletwa Township began blocking the road in December 2006 and threatened to arrest anyone on it until March 2007. The blockade affected trade to the area and primarily impacted upon the civilian population. [13]

The Chin National Front (CNF) formed in 1988 following the country-wide pro-democracy uprising. Ceasefire negotiations between the CNF and the SPDC started in 1995 but did not lead to a signed agreement. In April 2006, the CNF sent a message to the regime indicating that they were willing to discuss ceasefire negotiations, [14] though little progress was made during 2006.

In May 2006, authorities in Matupi used family lists and house registration information to attempt to identify local members of the CNF and to extort money from villagers. Families with absent members at the time were fined between 200 and 2,000 kyat. As their children were absent and fearing arrest, Mr. Cahlui and his wife Mrs. Namel fled the town and sought refugee status in India. SPDC army soldiers arrested Mr. Bi Khaw, Mrs. Khin Gwei and her mother, Mrs. Tlungluai, and Mr. Anthaw on the suspicion that they had connections with or were family of CNF members. [15]

On 17 May 2006, three Chin National Army (CNA) soldiers were fired upon and pursued by 17 SPDC soldiers of LIB #266 and 15 police personnel from the Hakha police station in Siarpi village area, Hakha Township. The CNA collects an annual tax on the Chin people and was collecting the tax from the village when they were fired upon. No one was killed; however, the Village Peace and Development Council (VPDC) chairman of the village was tortured by the SPDC soldiers for providing the CNA troops with a meal while they were in the village. [16]

The Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) and their armed branch, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), signed a ceasefire with the SPDC in 1994 and went from being considered one of the most powerful ethnic resistance groups in the country to being a group who submitted to the regime. In 2005, encouraged by the SPDC, a small group led by Colonel Lasang Awngwa calling, themselves the Kachin Solidarity Council (KSC), broke away from the KIO and surrendered to the SPDC, accepting the junta’s offer of security and territory. In return they promised to refrain from joining with other armed groups against the SPDC. By November 2005, some members had returned to the KIO. [17]

In return for signing the ceasefire agreement, the KIO was given control over significant areas in Kachin State including the border area with China, and was permitted to engage in certain areas of economic activity including jade mining operations and the leasing of part of Mai Ja Yang town to Chinese businessmen for casinos. [18] In August 2006, tests on the Malii Hka hydroelectricity power plant concluded. The plant was a joint project between the KIO and the SPDC and touted to provide more electricity to Myitkyina, the capital of Kachin State, at a lower rate. [19] In 2006, the KIA was reported to have signed an agreement with a Chinese company named Hai Nan Chang for 20,000 acres of sugarcane plantation. [20]

On 15 June 2006, the 77-year-old president of the KIO, Lamung Tu Jai, was reported to have died of “natural causes”. [21]

The KIO sent observers to the first National Convention in 1993, and was a full participant in when it resumed in 2004. The Kachin National Organization (KNO), a group of Kachin’s in exile, has denounced the participation of Kachin ceasefire groups in the NC proceedings. [22] In October 2006, however, the KIO did take a stand against the SPDC, refusing to condemn the move to place Burma on the agenda of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and taking a neutral stance on the issue. As a result, the regime cracked down, focusing mainly on restricting the KIO’s economic activity and freedom of movement. KIO vehicles were not permitted to enter SPDC-controlled areas of Kachin State. Timber, gold and other trade from KIO areas was restricted through a blockade on the KIO’s major trade route, cutting off supplies of things like fresh produce, rice and fuel to KIO markets in Laiza. KIO members were reportedly telephoned and harassed, their vehicles detained and their movements restricted. [23] By the end of October, half of the 30 or so gold-mining operations in the N’Mai Hku area had to shut down and many businesses were suffering. [24]

On 2 January 2006, troops from IB #68, led by Hla Myo Aung, killed six KIA members while they were eating dinner in Muse in northern Shan State. Following the incident, Commander Hla Myo Aung was awarded a hero’s medal for his actions. [25]

In January 2006, SPDC troops shot and killed 20 KIA soldiers in the KIA’s 4th Brigade area. [26]

On 11 February 2006, SPDC troops arrested four KIA members for crossing a junta-controlled area in Mansi Township, Kachin State. KIA members had routinely travelled in this area in the past without incident. [27]

In April 2006, SPDC troops attacked the KIA’s 2nd and 8th Brigades. On 20 April 2006, SPDC soldiers stormed four KIA 4th Brigade outposts near Mongko in northern Shan State. [28] A total of 13 KIA soldiers were captured in the raid. On 21 April 2006, a further 14 KIO members were detained by SPDC troops in the Maijaya region of northern Shan State. [29]

On 29-30 June 2006, KIO bases near Wine Maw were attacked by SPDC army forces. Two KIO soldiers were injured and five were captured. Both bases are close to the area under the control of the SPDC-allied New Democratic Army-Kachin (NDA-K) faction led by Zahkung Ting Ying. [30] Another report claimed that 4 KIO soldiers were killed and nine, including Deputy-Commander 2nd Lieutenant Loon Swe, were captured. On 6 July 2006, the KIO met with the NDA-K in Myikyina, to discuss the return of the prisoners, however the NDA-K had already handed them over to the SPDC. [31]

In December 2006, the regime caused local residents even more concern when it launched an extensive 12-battalion military exercise in the KIA-controlled Samar region. Ten battalions under Military Operations Command (MOC) #3 and two battalions stationed at the #904 gun station practised artillery firing drills with 120 mm, 105 mm and 76 mm field guns from 14 December 2006 until 22 December 2006. Five days into the exercise, the KIO submitted a formal complaint with the SPDC and requested that the military exercise be ceased. Exiled Kachin groups expressed concern over the potentially destabilising impact of the military exercises. [32]

The KIO has suffered a number of splits over the years. In 1989, the New Democratic Army-Kachin (NDA-K) was formed when two KIO officers, Zahkung Tingying and Layawk Zelum, broke away and signed a ceasefire pact with the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC; the junta as it was known prior to 15 November 1997). The NDA-K is based in Pang Wa, on the Sino-Burma border, where they control the area known as Kachin State Special Region-1. In 2005, there was an internal coup among the leadership of the NDA-K. The coup leaders were quickly overthrown and the group soon went back to supporting the SPDC. [33]

On 24 May 2006, fighting between two NDA-K factions occurred in Kanpaite, Kachin State. The faction led by Layawk Zelum launched a surprise attack on Zahkung Tingying’s opposing faction. Zakhung Tingying and Layawk Zelum are reported to command 300 and 200 troops respectively. The small scale fighting was thought to be an attempt to seize Kanpaite, then under the control of Zahkung Tingying. The fighting drew SPDC Infantry Battalions (IB) #74, 121 and 236 into the area. [34]

Karen State has endured a long and turbulent history of ethnic resistance. The Karen first took up arms against the regime in 1949, less than two years after the country gained independence. The Karen’s struggle for self-determination has continued, largely unabated for almost 60 years. This has placed the Karen in the esteemed position of waging one of the longest continuously running insurgencies in history. The main Karen opposition group is the Karen National Union (KNU), with its armed wing the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA). The KNU has been widely considered as one of the stronger resistance groups opposing the military regime, which had, at one point in its history, advanced as far as Insein on the outskirts of Rangoon and seriously threatened to take the capital. However, over the years, the KNU has suffered a number of splits, the most devastating of which came in December 1994 with the formation of the splinter group, the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA).

Almost immediately following the split, Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt, Secretary-1 of the SLORC, forged an alliance with the DKBA, granting them financial and material support in exchange for their help to destroy the KNU. Less than a month later, a joint force of hundreds of SLORC and DKBA soldiers launched a major attack on the KNU headquarters at Manerplaw. The DKBA soldiers knew the way through the extensive minefields surrounding the headquarters and the weaknesses of key defensive positions, and ultimately, Manerplaw fell. Less than a month after that, another KNU stronghold at nearby Kaw Moo Rah, was also overrun.

The DKBA went on the offensive, launching at least 12 significant attacks on KNU territory over the next three years, including attacking refugee camps in Thailand where they killed more than 20 people. It would seem that their deal with the junta has paid off, for since that time, the sphere of DKBA influence has expanded to the point where they now have a presence in six of the seven Karen Districts, and are mostly free to conduct their business without interference from the military. They have, however, embraced many of the same policies used by the junta and are also guilty of committing widespread violations of human rights against the same people that they claim to be working for the benefit of. (For more information see Section 8.4 Abuse of Ethnic Minorities by Ceasefire Groups below).

In January 2004, the KNU established an informal verbal ceasefire with the SPDC, referred to as a “gentleman’s agreement”. However, despite this ceasefire, sporadic clashes still occurred between the SPDC and KNLA soldiers. Moreover, the SPDC continued to use violence against Karen villagers. Many KNLA soldiers reportedly could not bear to stand by and do nothing as their people suffered under the widespread perpetration of human rights abuses, yet their hands were tied by orders to observe the ceasefire and not to engage with SPDC forces. The SPDC thus used this opportunity to strengthen their grip on the areas they controlled in addition to expanding their influence and establishing new camps in areas that they were never previously able to access without coming under attack by the KNLA. Then, in November 2005, SPDC army units commenced launching military assaults on undefended Karen villages in northern Karen State, shelling them with mortars and firing upon them with machine guns and assault rifles. [36] Within months, the offensive spread from Toungoo District into adjacent Nyaunglebin and Papun Districts. [37] According to the independent aid organization, the Free Burma Rangers (FBR), approximately 25,000 villagers were displaced by the attacks and the human rights abuses that accompanied the increased militarization of the region. [38] Some groups have argued that the SPDC used the ceasefire as the vehicle from which they launched the continuing Karen offensive. [39]

This offensive, unlike so many of those in previous years, continued throughout the rainy season. The pattern observed in previous offensives is that ordinarily, the SPDC army soldiers withdraw from the hills at the onset of the rains which typically commence around May each year. Travel in the hills becomes exceedingly difficult as the steep hillsides are quickly turned into slippery and treacherous slopes. The SPDC army soldiers thus return to their bases in the plains and along roadsides from where they continue to demand extortion and forced labour from local villages. Not long after the rains stop around October, the soldiers return to the hills where they resume hunting the internally displaced to force them out of the hills and into areas where the military can maintain a presence and therefore control. This cycle has repeated itself almost annually over the past decade, particularly in northern Karen State where the topography is more mountainous and more heavily forested. In southern Karen State, where the terrain is much flatter and far more open, the SPDC has been much more successful in exerting their control over the population, and as such major military offensives are less common. This is in spite the fact that the KNLA also operates in these areas. It must be noted that the primary target of the current offensive, like the vast majority of those before it, is not the armed resistance of the KNLA, but rather unarmed civilian villagers. [40]

Dozens of additional SPDC army battalions were moved into northern Karen State to reinforce battalions already stationed there. In October 2006, the Free Burma Rangers (FBR) estimated there to be 60-70 SPDC army battalions operating in the offensive area covered by Toungoo, Nyaunglebin and Papun Districts. [41] Meanwhile, the Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG) stated in November that their field researchers had identified 27 SPDC army battalions operating in Toungoo District alone. These were organized into 54 operational columns and comprised of an estimated 3,780 SPDC army soldiers. Ordinarily, there are only 12 SPDC army battalions stationed in Toungoo District at any one time. [42] SPDC army forces mounted regular patrols through the hills of northern Karen State in search of internally displaced persons (IDPs), their settlements and their food supplies. Any IDPs that they found have been either captured and forcibly relocated to SPDC-controlled relocation sites, or simply shot-on-sight, while any IDP hiding sites or hidden food caches discovered by the soldiers have been ransacked and then destroyed. The soldiers eat what they can, carry off what they are able, and destroy the rest. Few villagers have much left in the way of food and starvation hangs ominously over the heads of many. Moreover, fields and plantations and IDP sites alike have been sown with landmines for the purpose of discouraging the villagers from returning lest they step on one. Many villagers from the region have reported that aside from threats to their physical security, their greatest concern is the lack of food. [43] (For more information, see Chapter 5: Deprivation of Livelihood). Facing the very real possibility of being shot if seen, IDPs therefore do what they can to avoid all contact with SPDC army units. Many must regularly move from place to place whenever an SPDC army patrol draws near, fleeing deeper into the forest to avoid detection. [44] (For more information, see Chapter 13: Internal Displacement and Forced Relocation). The ongoing offensive in northern Karen State has expanded to become the largest military offensive in the region for the past decade. [45]

However, in spite of the continuation of heinous abuses of human rights, the somewhat obvious dissolution of the ceasefire and the insincerity of the SPDC, the KNU leadership insisted on attempting to reopen negotiations. Finally, in July 2006, in the face of increasing atrocities committed by the SPDC in Karen State, the KNU declared they would make no agreement with the junta until the attacks against Karen civilians ceased. [46] However, in late September 2006, the KNU sent a four-person delegation of military officers to resume talks with the junta. [47] The delegation travelled to Rangoon and met with Major General Ye Myint of Military Affairs Security. At the meeting, the KNU was told that the “gentleman’s agreement” had been nullified and a new round of negotiations would be required, albeit this time with military personnel from the KNLA, rather than with officials from the KNU leadership. [48] In late December 2006, Thai military officials agreed to mediate talks between the junta and members of the KNU Central Committee in Rangoon, [49] however no formal agreement was reached and the offensive in Karen State continued into 2007.

In July 2006, Brigadier General Htain Maung, commanding officer of the KNLA 7th Brigade and the Tactical Commander of General Headquarter (GHQ) Battalions, Colonel Ner Dah Mya, son of General Bo Mya, declared they would not heed the commands of certain KNU leaders, whom they accused of corruption. [50] Many worried the disagreement would lead to another split in the KNU and some speculated the discord came as a result of the SPDC’s attempts to cause internal divisions. The KNU issued a statement confirming that the SPDC had made overtures towards certain group members, urging members to remain united. [51] On 21 August 2006, the KNU and the two dissenting commanders held a formal meeting to resolve their differences. [52] However, it would seem that these matters were never fully reconciled (see below).

Signalling what many have referred to a the end of an era, on 24 December 2006, General Bo Mya, former KNU president and commander of the KNLA, died at the age of 79 from complications arising from diabetes. [53] KNU officials stated that their cause would not die with their leader. [54] Bo Mya was widely respected and many groups from both sides of the conflict expressed their condolences, including members of the DKBA, the SPDC and the Royal Thai Army (RTA) who attended his funeral service at the KNLA #202 battalion headquarters in Pa’an District. [55] Some reports maintained that as many as 10,000 people attended the funeral, [56] though those in attendance put this number closer to approximately 5,000 mourners. [57] Controversy arose when Colonel Ner Dah Mya, son of the late leader, invited the SPDC to attend his father’s funeral. Colonel Myat Htun Oo accepted the invitation, upsetting many high-ranking KNU officials who, in protest, boycotted the service.

Within days of the death of General Bo Mya, Htaing Maung led a number of KNLA officers in ceasefire negotiations with the SPDC without prior consent from the KNU Central Committee. Htain Maung and his followers were warned repeatedly to cease all negotiations, and failing to comply were ultimately ejected from the KNU on 30 January 2007. The following day, Htain Maung announced the creation of the newest Karen splinter faction, dubbed the Karen National Union / Karen National Liberation Army Peace Council (KNU/KNLAPC), of which he is chairman. On 11 February 2007, a peace ceremony is held in Kawkareik, Karen State to celebrate the ceasefire agreement reached with the KNU/KNLAPC and their “return to the legal fold”. [58]

On 2 March 2006, a bomb exploded near an electrical transformer in Ward 20 of Toungoo town. On 8 March 2006, another bomb exploded near No. 1 Basic Education High School in Ward 19, also in Toungoo. There were no casualties in either explosion. The state-controlled New Light of Myanmar declared that the bombers were Saw Gay The Mu, Saw Nay La and Saw Baw Shwe He. The report maintained that Saw Baw Shwe He is a private in the KNLA 5th Brigade (operating in Papun District). KNU officials denied any involvement in the bombings, claiming that they were observing the ceasefire. Local villagers also doubted the reports. One villager was reported to say: “I think it is a plot by them [SPDC]. I think they want to propagandise that the KNU did it … Outsiders could never enter [Toungoo]. … There are so many checkpoints, which are saturated with members of the police, USDA (Union Solidarity Development Association) and the intelligence”. [59] Other groups supported this speculation. In June 2006, KHRG stated that “It appears far more likely that the SPDC are planting the bombs themselves in order to strike terror into the hearts of the people living there so that they may be lulled into the belief that continued military rule is necessary for the stability of the nation, and to justify offensives against villagers in Karen State”. [60]

Between 1 January 2006 and 31 December 2006, the KNU reported a total of 1,383 clashes with the SPDC and their allied ceasefire proxy armies, in which they killed a total of 372 soldiers and wounded 1,098. Over the year, 39 soldiers surrendered to the KNU, [61] including two ethnic Arakanese who surrendered in March 2006, who cited discrimination as the cause of their desertion from the SPDC ranks. [62] Over the year, the KNU reported 24 of their own troops killed in battle and a further 20 wounded. [63]

In May 2005, the SPDC began pressuring the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) to disarm and completely surrender to the SPDC. [64] However, the group continued to cooperate with the regime and retain its arms. An unnamed DKBA official was reported as saying that the group was, “very likely to merge with the KNU if the junta keeps pressuring it to disarm”. [65] Despite some statements made by certain DKBA leaders, who expressed their concern over division among the Karen, 2006 did not see any reconciliation between the two main Karen groups. The year 2006 saw a continuation of hostilities between the DKBA and the KNU, which on occasion resulted in armed clashes. The DKBA also continued to act on behalf of the SPDC and was responsible for committing a large number of human rights abuses in Karen State (For more information, see Section 8.4 Abuse of Ethnic Minorities by Ceasefire Groups).

In many cases, the DKBA operates in the same manner and to the same end as the SPDC, controlling and manipulating villagers through detention, interrogation and torture. The DKBA takes Karen villagers as porters and extorts funds from villages and farmers, as well as using them to obtain information about the movements and activities of KNU and KNLA members. [66]

On 4 March 2006, Chan Naung and Yer Phoo, both 18-year-old Privates from DKBA #901 Battalion were both shot in the head by SPDC army soldiers from IB #18 near Three Pagoda Pass. The M-16’s and pistols of the two dead men were reportedly taken from their bodies after the incident, though why two 18-year-old privates were armed with pistols is unclear; it are normally only officers who are issued with sidearms. SPDC Southeast Command ordered Major Hla Min, commander of IB #18 to pay compensation to the DKBA for the deaths. The SPDC reported the incident to be a case of mistaken identity, claiming that they were fighting KNU troops at the time, however, the area is heavily controlled by the DKBA and the KNU does not have any troops in the area. [67] Lieutenant Colonel Soe Moe, DKBA #901 Battalion commanding officer, also found the event highly suspicious and doubted it was a case of friendly fire. According to him, it seemed clear that the SPDC troops were attacking DKBA positions. [68]

Despite these tensions, in June 2006, DKBA Brigades #333, #777 and #999 in Thaton District and in parts of southern Papun District were operating together. According to KHRG, the SPDC had given the DKBA 200 million kyat to participate in joint operations in the area. [69] In December 2006, the highest concentration of DKBA troops was found in Thaton District, which has allowed the SPDC to redeploy its troops to greater effect elsewhere. During 2006, units from 11 different DKBA battalions were repoted as having been active in Thaton District with a total of approximately 650 soldiers. [70] The close relationship between the SPDC and the DKBA was particularly evident in December 2006, when SPDC officials for the first time joined approximately 5,000 people attending Karen New Year celebrations in DKBA #999 Brigade Special Battalion headquarters at Shwe Ko Ko in Pa’an District. [71]

One of the more marginalised groups of armed Karen, the Karen Peace Force (KPF), was formed in 1997 and operates out of the Three Pagoda Pass Township in southeastern Karen State where it is reported to have several profitable business ventures. The KPF is believed to field approximately 300 soldiers.

In 2005, the KPF obtained permission from the SPDC Southeast Command, which operates in the area, to operate gambling halls in Three Pagoda Pass Township. It was estimated in October 2006 that the KPF was able to collect up to 300,000 baht per month, even after paying kickbacks and bribes to SPDC township officials. It was speculated that the junta approved the operation not only to secure cooperation from the KPF and a good income through taxation, but also to occupy people so that they don’t turn to politics. According to one local resident:

God’s Army was originally formed and led by Saw Shaw Pyar, a former KNU official. Though, in 1997, the group came under the leadership of twin boys Luther and Johnny Htoo. Legend has it that when their village was under attack by the military, most of the Karen soldiers defending it fled in fear. This roused the twins, said to be nine-years-old at the time, to rally a few villagers to stay and fight, armed with little more than a few pistols and grenades. The legend states that though they were hopelessly outnumbered and outgunned, the boys led the villagers to victory, killing many SLORC soldiers in the process. Rumours quickly spread of their supernatural powers, which among things, maintained that they were impervious to bullets.

In 1999, the group joined forces with the Vigorous Burmese Student Warriors (VBSW) and seized control of the Burmese embassy in Bangkok. Not long after, in January 2000, God’s Army troops took over a hospital in Ratchaburi, Thailand. A siege ensued and all ten of the God’s Army soldiers were killed by Royal Thai Army (RTA) commandos. After that, the group has had a rather low profile and the twins moved to live in refugee camps in Thailand.

The State-run New Light of Myanmar reported that on 17 June 2006, Johnny Htoo surrendered to SPDC army officers of the Coastal Military Command in southeastern Burma along with eight of his comrades and all of their weapons. Many, however, doubted the report, labelling it as “just a story made by the military junta”. [73] Nothing has been reported of him since his alleged surrender.

The Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) was formed in 1957 and has survived a number of separations and splits in the years since. Those who left the party in 1995, 1999 and 2002, formed various splinter groups and signed ceasefire pacts with the SPDC. [74] On 21 March 1995, the KNPP itself signed its first ceasefire pact with the regime, although it lasted only three months. In June, the SLORC used the ceasefire to move more troops into the region which they then used to launch a new offensive against the KNPP and their armed wing, the Karenni Army (KA). By March 1996, all of the main KNPP bases had fallen to the SLORC. Since that time, the KNPP has resumed active armed resistance against the regime with several clashes reported to have occurred during 2006.

From December 2004 until May 2005, the SPDC launched an intensive attack against the KA headquarters with artillery back up and support from troops from the Karenni ceasefire factions: the Karenni Nationalities People’s Liberation Front (KNPLF) and Karenni National Solidarity Organization (KnSO). [75] During one of these engagements on 15 February 2005, the SPDC was accused of using chemical weapons against the Karenni. A number of SPDC army defectors reported that they had to wear gloves and facemasks while transporting ammunition boxes emblazoned with a skull and crossbones. KA soldiers reported that SPDC bombings produced yellow clouds of smoke, which produced blisters, lung irritation, diarrhoea, vomiting, and difficulty breathing in those who inhaled it, symptoms which lasted up to eight months for some soldiers. According to Christian Solidarity Worldwide (CSW), the symptoms experienced by the soldiers who had inhaled the fumes were consistent with exposure to some sort of chemical weapon. [76]

In February 2006, the KNPP was fighting SPDC troops in eastern Burma, in what the KNPP said was an attempt by the regime to pressure them into accepting the terms of the failed 1995 ceasefire agreement. [77] The terms offered by the regime remain unchanged from the 1995 agreement and the KNPP to date have proven reluctant to sign.

In May 2006, the SPDC officially labelled the KNPP a “terrorist group” and encouraged the Thai military to help eradicate the group. [78]

The Karenni Nationalities People’s Liberation Front (KNPLF) was formed when approximately 200 members of the KNPP broke away from the group in 1978. Once a communist anti-government force, the KNPLF signed a ceasefire with the junta in June 1994. [79] Immediately, the SPDC pitted the KNPLF forces against the KNPP, promising the former lucrative income through control of border-tax gates, the tin and wolfram mines in Mawchi, and taxes on logging, if it could wrest control of these operations away from the KNPP and act as a village security force in the name of the SPDC.

Much like the DKBA in Karen State, the KNPLF often serve as a proxy for junta forces, searching for KNPP units and interrogating local villagers for information on their whereabouts and activities. In June 2006, Karenni women reported being detained and tortured with other pregnant women by SPDC troops after KNPLF forces informed the junta that their husbands were involved with KNPLF activities. [80]

On 7 June 2006, it was reported that a group of three armed KNPLF members crossed into Thailand in search of a village headman they believed to have contacts with the KNPP. The soldiers, based in the Huay Pu Luang area near the Thai-Burma border crossed into the Thai village of Huay Pu Kay village in Mae Hong Son province where they were reportedly accompanied by a Thai national during their search. Eyewitnesses reported that the soldiers carried weapons concealed under their clothing. The village headman, Maung Htan, learned of this and went into hiding out of fear for his safety, from where he was reported to have said: “They think I have contacts with the organization here [KNPP]. They used to send some people to call me but I didn’t dare to go. I’m sure they’ll do something to me”. [81]

Furthermore, according to KHRG, the KNPLF were also used by the SPDC during their attacks on civilian villagers in eastern Toungoo District in Karen State in late-2005 and 2006. [82]

Moreover, on 15 January 2006, clearly at the behest of the junta, the KNPLF released a press statement condemning the UNSC resolution to put Burma on its agenda stating that, the KNPLF, “will make a harmonious effort in collaboration with the government to handle the internal affairs of our nation.” [83]

In October 2002, KNPP battalion commander Bo Ta Neh, along with approximately 100 men broke away from the KNPP and surrendered themselves to the SPDC. Similar to the policy used with the KNPLF, the SPDC has used the KnSO against their former comrades in the KNPP as well as in the ongoing military offensive in northern Karen State. [84]

Much like the Karen, Mon resistance has been organised since a very early stage by an administrative political group, the New Mon State Party (NMSP), with active resistance being carried out by its armed wing, the Mon National Liberation Army (MNLA). However, unlike the Karen, the NMSP signed a ceasefire pact with the regime in 1995 in return for the right to retain arms in Mon State, some economic assistance and logging and fishing concessions. The NMSP holds territory in 12 areas in Mon State although 2005 and 2006 saw an increase in the SPDC militarization of the southern part of the state.

According to reports by the Kaowao News, the NMSP previously received monthly payments from the SPDC of 4.1 million kyat. [85] Though all payments ceased in July 2005 after the group spoke up in favour of federalism at the National Convention proceedings. [86] The payments were partially resumed in September 2005, although economic concessions to the group were withdrawn and movement restrictions on NMSP members were strictly enforced. [87]

In January 2006, the NMSP elected their first woman to the Central Committee. Mi Sar Dar, 41, is also in charge of the Mon National Education Department (MNED) and chairperson of Mon Women’s Organization (MWO). In August 2006, she was suspended from her post for three months after purchasing a rubber plantation worth 20 million kyat without first properly consulting other party members. [88]

In February 2006, explosives destroyed part of a gas pipeline near Kwan Hlar village in Mudon Township. Soldiers from Southeast Command arrested 11 village leaders including the chairman and the secretary of Kwan Hlar village. They were all released in mid-May, after being forced to sign a statement indicating that the NMSP member Nai Ong Janah caused the gas explosion. One million kyat was demanded for the release of each village leader. NMSP denies responsibility for the explosion and insists that Nai Ong Janah was not involved. [89]

In April 2006, 82 representatives from Mon communities in Burma and abroad held the third annual Mon National Conference. Participants came from Europe, USA, Canada, Australia, Malaysia and Thailand. The main subject for debate was the continuation or cessation of the ten-year-old ceasefire agreement. [90] All the same, on 29 June 2006, the party celebrated the 11th anniversary of the signing of the agreement in Moulmein, although the celebrations were on a much smaller scale than those in the previous years. [91]

On 8 August 2006, NMSP celebrated the 59th Mon Revolution Day with a call for the SPDC to engage in a tripartite dialogue. [92] In September 2006, NMSP’s Central Committee held public consultations and a debate on whether to participate in the National Convention (NC) proceedings. [93] Party members continued to be divided on the issue of the ceasefire and on participation in any form at the NC. [94] Nevertheless, a three-person delegation attended the NC, again with the status of observers. [95] Although complying with the regime’s wishes that the NMSP attend the NC, the party refused to oppose the addition of Burma to the UNSC, to the widespread support of the Mon people in Burma and abroad. [96] The NMSP made a firm decision in October 2006 not to break the formal ceasefire agreement with the military regime, despite being urged to reconsider their position by the Australia-based Mon National Council (MNC), and other exiled Mon groups. [97] The NMSP’s political stance was not welcomed by the junta and the military responded with intimidation similar to that used on other ceasefire parties. On 8 October 2006, three SPDC army officers attempted to enter the NMSP-controlled territory without seeking prior permission from the NMSP. It was reported that one officer from Southeast Command, one from Military Operation Management Command (MOMC) #19, and another, a military officer commanding 30 soldiers (possibly a captain or lieutenant), planned to survey uncultivated land in NMSP-controlled areas. One unnamed NMSP spokesperson was reported to have said: “I don’t think we should allow them to enter our central administrative area. If they do not listen to us, we should start a civil war again. This is the only way we can stop them.” [98]

On 14 October 2006, food support to the NMSP’s central administrative area was cut off. In November 2006, the NMSP began a public campaign in the border areas to garner support for their political stance and raise awareness of the issues facing the Mon. [99] The campaign continued for three weeks in Ye Township of Mon State, Yepyu Township of Tenasserim (Tanintharyi) Division and Three Pagodas Pass Township of Karen State, though at its completion, the food support had still not resumed. [100]

In mid-December 2006, an NMSP office in Wae Ka Lung village, Thanbyuzayat Township was served written orders by the SPDC army Southeast Command to vacate the premises immediately, alleging that the NMSP members from the office were “frightening villagers with guns”. The NMSP denied the claims but were forced to comply with the orders. The SPDC established themselves in the village soon after it had been vacated by the NMSP, although ironically, local villagers have reported that they have far more to fear from the SPDC than they do from the NMSP. In 2005, the NMSP office located in Pa Nga village was also ordered to close for the same reason. [101]

Led by Mon resistance fighter Chan Done, the Mon Armed Group (MAG) operates in Southern Mon State. [102] The party was formed when the NMSP signed a ceasefire agreement with the junta in 1995. Approximately 100 soldiers left the group to continue fighting the regime. When the group first formed, it was originally known as the Mon National Warrior Army (MNWA) and led by Nai Hloin and his brother Nai Bin, it operated primarily in northern Tenasserim (Tanintharyi) Division. In 2005, an SPDC offensive caused the brothers to flee to Thailand and Chan Done and Nai Sook Gloin took over as leaders of the movement. [103]

On 12 March 2006, five men who claimed that they were members of the is small and largely inactive opposition group, the Myeik-Dawei United Front (MDUF), surrendered to officers of the SPDC Southeastern Command in the border town of Three Pagoda Pass. The MDUF is also sometimes referred to as the Mergui-Tavoy United Front (MTUF). The group was led by two men identified as U Zee Yin and Thang Chung. They surrendered two pistols to the regime and in return were resettled on 30 acres of land on the outskirts of Three Pagodas Pass town where they were free to conduct business. The MDUF, however, denied that any of their members had surrendered to the regime. [104]

Also, on 24 March 2006, another five members of the MDUF surrendered to the SPDC in Three Pagoda Pass. Two women were reportedly included in this group. A local source maintained that “These people were sent to Rangoon recently. If they stayed in ThreePagodaPass it would have become unsafe for them”. [105]

As the largest ethnic minority state in Burma, and as one of the most ethnically diverse, there are a number of groups working out of Shan State. Recognising this threat, the regime has maintained a fairly consistent military presence in the state since taking power. In 2005, there was a particular crackdown against Shan activists by the regime. In February 2005, a number of Shan leaders were arrested on charges of on charges of “treason, ‘discrediting the nation’, disrupting the National Convention, flouting stringent censorship laws and for economic offences” after making comments against the National Convention. [106] Those leaders who were arrested included:

Khun Tun Oo, Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) chairman;
Sai Nyunt Lwin, SNLD secretary;
Sai Hla Aung, SNLD central committee member;
Sao Kyar Oo, SNLD member;
U Myint Than, Shan New Generation Youth (SNGY) member;
General Hso Ten, Shan State Peace Council (SSPC) chairman; and
U Shwe Ohn, United Nationalities League for Democracy (UNLD) chairman. [107]

All of these leaders were sentenced to excessively long prison terms. General Hso Ten and Khun Tun Oo, for example, were sentenced to 106 and 93 years respectively. [108]

The United Wa State Army (UWSA) is based in Wa territory in the northern part of Shan State. The UWSA was formed in 1989, after the collapse of the Communist Party of Burma (CPB), and signed a ceasefire with the regime in May of the same year. The group is led by Bao Yuxiang and Kyauk Nyi Lai. The UWSA’s forces are based along the Chinese border from Kokang to Mongla and along the Thai border areas from Tachilek to Homong with their main area of control officially known as Special Region No. 2, Shan State. [109]

Although the group profits greatly from its affiliation with the SPDC, villages remain largely undeveloped and lack basic healthcare and education. In return for supporting SPDC troops in their attacks against other ethnic minority groups, the SPDC has for a long time turned a blind eye to the prolific drug operations based in Wa territory; the source of much of the UWSA’s wealth, arms and power. [110] There has been a lot of speculation over the past several years that the SPDC has been complicit in the drug trade and have received kickbacks from groups such as the UWSA for permitting such activities to transpire unpunished.

In 2005, the UWSA publicly promised to cease their drug production and trade. They claim they have done so and are currently facing financial difficulty due to a loss of revenue in this area. Many doubt that the UWSA’s involvement in the illicit drug trade has actually ceased. The Ethnic Youth Network Group (EYNG) released a report on 14 October 2006 claiming that the number of opium plantations in Shan and Karenni State had actually increased in size from 2005 to 2006, contrary to claims made by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) who maintained that heroin production had decreased. [111] On 9 November 2006, six USWA members were detained and 290,000 methamphetamine tablets were seized in Tawkaw village, Hawngleuk village tract. On 11 November 2006, two more members were arrested after 60 kilograms of heroin was found in block form in two hotels owned by the UWSA. [112]

In 2005, the UWSA’s privileged position with the SPDC deteriorated slightly when the SPDC revoked the group’s right to possess unregistered motor vehicles and subsequently arrested 100 UWSA members who did not follow the new restrictions. [113] The SPDC also shut down three USWA-affiliated banks in 2005, indicted on charges of money laundering. [114] In addition, the regime requested that Chinese officials introduce restrictions on the importation of timber and minerals into China from Wa territory. The restrictions began on 26 March 2006 and resulted in a severe cutback in income for the UWSA, as the cross-border trade had all but ceased. The SPDC tried to take advantage of the UWSA’s financial crunch by demanding SPDC-controlled immigration, customs and schools into what was previously an autonomous region. [115] It was also reported that the SPDC has been pressuring the USWA to join them in attacking SSA-S troops in the region. [116]

In an attempt to make money elsewhere, the UWSA signed an agreement in July 2006 with the Chinese company, Hai Nan Chang. The agreement involves the Chinese using 33,333 acres of land in Pan San, Mai Pok, Mai Mao, Hnam Tit, Wen Kong and Pang Feng Townships for rubber plantations. [117] The Chinese also expressed their support of UWSA’s anti-drug activities by donating 10,000 tons of rice to assist farmers whose previous source of income was opium cultivation. [118]

The SPDC has continued to use the UWSA in its campaigns against the opposition Shan State Army – South (SSA-S). It was reported that both sides were believed to have suffered as many as 770 casualties from clashes during the two months of March and April of 2005. [119] The combined forces of the SPDC and UWSA persisted in launching violent skirmishes against the SSA-S throughout 2006.

On 9 April 2006, the SPDC issued a formal “invitation” to the UWSA to disarm and “exchange arms for perpetual peace”. The UWSA offered no official public response, but one unnamed UWSA source was quoted to state that “It will be impossible for us to comply”. [120] Though, despite growing disunity between the two groups, representatives from the USWA attended the National Convention proceedings in October 2006. [121]

When the Mong Thai Army (MTA) signed a ceasefire agreement with the SPDC in 1996, the Shan State Army-South (SSA-S) formed as one of the groups of MTA soldiers unhappy with the move. Whereas the MTA was known more for their involvement in the drug industry than they were for representing the people, the SSA-S became known as a legitimate representative of the Shan ethnic minority. Since the SPDC will only accept a complete surrender of arms from the SSA-S, no ceasefire negotiations have ever taken place between the two groups. [122]

On 2 January 2006, approximately 40 soldiers of the SSA-S 241st Brigade and their commander, Sa Khun Kyaw, surrendered to the SPDC near the village of Namtee in Nam Kham Township of northeastern Shan State. [123] Following the surrender, the SPDC operations in northern Shan State intensified. Six SPDC Light Infantry Battalions (LIB) launched an attack against the SSA-C. [124] On 4 March 2006, 24 of the 40 men who had surrendered , including Sa Khun Kyaw, were sentenced to death by a martial court in Lashio prison on charges of drug-trafficking, murder, and the use of child soldiers. A spokesperson for the SSA-S denied all charges. [125]

In April 2005, members of the 758th Brigade, led by Colonel Moengzuen, left the group and formed the independent Shan State Army – Central (SSA-C). Colonel Moengzuen supported the declaration of an independent Shan State and declared allegiance to the Interim Shan Government (ISG), leaving the SSA-S. [126] In April 2006, a delegation of 300 SSA-S soldiers was sent to central Shan State, allegedly to seek reconciliation with SSA-C. It was reported that the group was attacked by SPDC troops from LIB #520, 332, 574 and 576. SSA-S officials did not confirm or deny these attacks, nor did they comment on the number of fatalities, if any. [127]

On 6 July 2006, the SPDC reported that 848 men from the breakaway 758th Brigade faction of the SSA-S, led by Colonel Moengzuen (aka Mein Sein), relinquished over 800 rifles, 55 hand grenades, 63 landmines and communications equipment to the SPDC in return for “assistance for their livelihood” and land. [128] Meanwhile, SSA-S spokesman Nam Khur Hsen confirmed that Moengzuen had left the group, but claimed he had taken only his personal bodyguard, around 35 people, with him. The SPDC has on many occasions forced local villagers into uniforms and participate in the surrender ceremony to give the impression that far more soldiers had actually defected. The SSA-S spokesperson also claimed that Colonel Moengzuen had been recently charged with illegally taxing Shan citizens of more than 90 million kyat, while the SPDC-controlled New Light of Myanmar carried a photograph of Brigadier General Thaung Aye, commanding officer of the SPDC army Eastern Command, donating 30 million kyat to Colonel Moengzuen. [129] Then in a backflip on 2 August 2006, Colonel Moengzuen and 70 of his men withdrew from their base at Namhu Phra Htam in Laikha Township. The men rejoined the SSA-S while Moengzuen pled for amnesty through an intermediary. [130] However, these men later left the SSA-S and rejoined Moengzuen in his undisclosed location where he waited for reinstatement in his former SSA-S position. [131] As a result of the defection from the side of the regime, SPDC troops tightened control in the Le Char area of northeastern Shan State and repeatedly engaged SSA-S troops in daily clashes. [132]

The ongoing clashes between SSA-S troops and the SPDC army have made life very difficult for the villagers. On 1 December 2006, soldiers from LIB #514 demanded that four soldiers be housed in each village in the Wankeng village tract in Mongkerng Township to survey possible SSA-S activities in the area. The SPDC army soldiers threatened to kill ten villagers for every one of their soldiers killed while operating in the Township. The following day, the SSA-S ambushed SPDC army soldiers from LIB #514, killing seven, including a Major, and wounding ten more. Fear of being executed in retaliation then prompted 20 villagers to flee across the border to Thailand. Many more would also have made the trip if only they could afford it. One villager explained that one family with four children had to pay approximately one million kyat to make the journey. Very few villagers possess this amount of money. [133]

In November and December 2006, the SPDC increased the number of battalions stationed in Shan State. IB #221, and LIB #570, 571 and 316 arrived on 27 November 2006, and almost daily fighting occurred throughout early December in the border area near Tachilek. [134] On 12 December 2006, the number of battalions in the immediate area rose to seven as LIB #360 and LIB #314 also arrived. [135] There were some reports that United Wa State Army (UWSA) troops fought alongside the SPDC army troops, [136] however the UWSA denied this. [137]

The Shan State National Army (SSNA) was formed when military strategist, Colonel Kurn Yawd broke away from the Mong Tai Army (MTA) with approximately 2,000 men in 1995 and soon developed an ‘unofficial’ ceasefire with the regime without ever holding formal negotiations to that effect. [138]

Over the past few years, however, they have been under increased pressure to surrender their arms to the SPDC, and in 2005 this pressure took the form of a consistent military offensive against SSNA troops. The SSNA 11th Brigade surrendered first in April 2005, followed soon after by the 19th Brigade. The remaining soldiers under the 6th, 9th and 16th Brigades loyal to Colonel Sai Yi broke the ceasefire pact completely in May 2005 and joined forces with the SSA-S to fight against the regime. In January 2006, Colonel Sai Yee was elected as Vice President of the SSA-S, solidifying the merger. [139]

Following the collapse of the SSNA in 2005, the SPDC turned their attention and their attacks on the Shan State Army – North (SSA-N). In September 2005, the SSA-N withdrew from some of its territory, following orders from the SPDC. Attempts to negotiate with the junta failed and the military began to direct its firepower against the group. In October 2005, the SSA-N 3rd Brigade surrendered to the SPDC. [140]

SPDC attacks against the SSA-N continued into 2006. On 10 February, SSA-N 3rd Brigade officers were fired upon by SPDC army soldiers while meeting with village headmen in the Mong Kher region in northern Shan State. No one was killed in the fighting. Following the attack, the SSA-N renewed efforts to negotiate with the junta. [141]

The Shan Nationalities People Liberation Organization (SNPLO) is a ceasefire group active in eastern Shan State. The SNPLO joined forces with the regime on 9 October 1994 and has reportedly become closely allied with the UWSA.

In late-2005, the group suffered a major split. Hkun Chit Maung split away from the SNPLO with approximately 100 men and established their base at Nawnghtao, Hsihseng Township, to the west of the Pawn River. The new faction was renamed the Pa’O Regional Nationalities Unity Organization (PNUO). His 100 troops were reinforced by additional soldiers from a fellow ceasefire group, the Pa’O National Army (PNA) and also received support and protection from the SPDC. The second faction, led by Hso Pyan, retained the SNPLO name with an estimated 250 men. Hso Pyan’s faction based themselves to the east of the Pawn River. No large-scale battles have occurred between the two groups although there have been a number of small skirmishes and ambushes.

On 22 March 2006, veteran Kayan commander, Major Kyaw King, was executed by Hkun Chit Maung on charges of agitating against Rangoon. [142]

In 2006, the SNPLO was quoted saying that year’s season was to be their last in the production of opium. Karenni researchers, however, noted a subsequent increase in the production of poppies in the area. Farmers in Pekon, Hsihseng and Mawkmai Townships in Shan State and Loikaw and Shadaw Townships in Karenni State pay a tax of approximately half a kilogram of opium per household to the SNPLO. The same farmers must also pay a tax of approximately 60,000 kyat per acre to SPDC army battalions based in Hsihseng. [143]

National Democratic Alliance Army-Eastern Shan State (NDAA-ESS) / ‘Mongla Group’

A ceasefire group since 1989, the NDAA-ESS comprises members of both the Shan and Akha ethnic minorities and is closely allied with the UWSA. Other allies include the Kokang and the NDA-K. Also known as the ‘Mongla Group’, they consider the Burmese regime to be an ally and allows state officials to operate in their territory in the areas of immigration, customs and education. In October 2006, the NDAA-ESS attended the National Convention. [144]

The NDAA-ESS, known officially as Special Region No. 4, is comprised of three brigades in eastern Shan State: headquarters with three battalions; the 369th Brigade with five battalions; and the 911th Brigade with seven battalions. All of their battalions are grossly understrength, each only fielding approximately 100-200 soldiers.

The NDAA-ESS claims to have the highest paid soldiers in the country, and business concerns, especially business coming from across the border with China, seems to be important for many group members. Special Region No. 4 gains a lot of income from Chinese tourists, particularly in casinos, and NDAA-ESS members have been hurt by the year long economic blockade imposed by China and encouraged by the Burmese regime. This makes the group somewhat vulnerable to economic pressure applied by the SPDC. However, one NDAA-ESS major claimed that “All top members … are not going to kowtow easily. … Only a few who have business interests are humming and hawing”. [145]

The Lahu Democratic Front (LDF) was founded in 1989 in opposition to the military junta. According to reports, the organization’s chairman and founder, U Aye Maung died in his home on 22 June 2006 at the age of 65. He had been admitted to a hospital in Chiang Mai, Thailand to relieve pressure on his brain, but was suddenly discharged only hours before his death. In remembrance, one unnamed Lahu woman said “He was a patriot. He made sacrifices in his revolutionary life”. [146]

Despite the frequent splits and splinters in the various armed ethnic resistance groups, political affiliations between different ethnic groups have let the creation of several multilateral resistance organisations.

The National Democratic Front (NDF) was the first such group to form in 1976 and comprised members of the Karen National Union (KNU), New Mon State Party (NMSP), Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), Karenni Nationalities Progressive Party (KNPP), Chin National Front (CNF), Arakan Liberation Party (ALP), Lahu Democratic Front (LDF), Palaung Liberation Front (PLF), Pa’O Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Wa National Organization (WNO). As with the majority of the multilateral resistance organisations, the efforts of the NDF were purely political and focused on the advocacy of a Federal Union of Burma and the equal rights and representation of ethnic minorities. [147]

In 1989, the Democratic Alliance of Burma (DAB) joined the NDF in their advocacy efforts with a membership that also included members of a broader pro-democracy movement in Burma. [148]

In 2001 the United Nationalities League for Democracy – Liberated Area (UNLD-LA) and the NDF founded the Ethnic Nationalities Solidarity and Cooperation Committee (ENSCC), which in 2004 was renamed the ENC. In 2005, the ENC commenced work on drafting a constitution for a democratic Burma. Unlike the constitution being forced upon the delegates at the National Convention, the constitution that emerged from the Ethnic Nationalities Council was founded on principals of federalism and ethnic minority rights. [149]

Working in conjunction with the NDF, the Ethnic Nationalities Solidarity and Cooperation Committee (ENSCC) was formed in August 2001. Its stated goal was to facilitate tripartite dialogue between the SPDC, the pro-democracy groups and the ethnic minority groups. The ENSCC tries to coordinate between the ethnic minority groups in order to achieve a degree of unity between them and advocate for their collective concerns.

The NDF held their sixth annual conference from 20 April 2006 to 22 April 2006. Representatives from nine of Burma’s armed ethnic resistance groups attended and spoke out against the ongoing violence, the National Convention and the Seven Point Roadmap To Democracy. [150]

The SPDC’s use of naked aggression against civilian inhabitants of ethnic minority areas gained unprecedented international attention in 2005 and 2006 when the regime commenced its largest campaign in northern Karen State since the massive offensives in 1997. Principally targeting civilians, SPDC army forces fired upon Karen villagers on sight, forcibly relocated those they could catch and deployed thousands of landmines targeted against those that they could not, burned whole villages and destroyed villagers’ food supplies. The attacks on villages and the perpetration of widespread human rights violations sent thousands of villagers fleeing for their lives. The Free Burma Rangers (FBR) estimated that by December 2006, approximately 25,000 villagers had fled their homes to hide in the forest where they hoped to avoid detection by SPDC army patrols. [151] However, this number is in addition to the approximately 120,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) already living in hiding in Karen State. [152] This offensive differed from previous offensives in that the attacks continued year-round, even during the rainy season when travel becomes difficult and the roads impassable to vehicles.

The 2005-2006 offensive in northern Karen State is a continuation of a pattern of state-directed violence against civilians which the SPDC has practised in ethnic minority areas of for decades. In its efforts to wipe out armed resistance and control ethnic minority groups, the SPDC typically targets ethnic minority villages, in direct contravention of not only the Geneva Conventions, but various other international treaties as well. (For more information specific to the Karen offensive, see Section 8.2 Ethnic Politics, Armed Resistance, and Ceasefire Agreements above).

Throughout the country, ceasefire agreements have proved to offer civilians little protection against violence and abuse. Quite often, the abuses have actually increased. Even when direct attacks and arbitrary killings are not occurring, the SPDC and their proxy ceasefire armies exploit ethnic villagers as forced labour, and abuse also them through the use of forced relocation, arbitrary arrest, extortion, land confiscation, destruction of property, rapes, beatings and torture.

Control and manipulation of ethnic identity by the military regime can be loosely grouped into three main strategies: direct violence, economic deprivation and cultural assimilation. Of these three, direct violence was perhaps the most obvious during 2006. Both ceasefire groups and SPDC army troops performed extrajudicial killings, arbitrarily detained villagers, beat and tortured civilians in ethnic minority areas across the country. For example, in Karen State during 2006, SPDC army soldiers shelled villages with mortars and fired into jungle areas where they suspected IDPs to be in hiding. (For more information, also see Chapter 2: Extra-judicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions). The rape of ethnic minority women and their forced marriage to SPDC army officers has been widely documented, most thoroughly in Shan, Karen and Chin States. (For more information, also see Chapter 7: Rights of Women).

Economic deprivation was also quite apparent during 2006. SPDC army soldiers and ceasefire armies alike routinely razed villagers’ crops and food supplies. Roads were blockaded and food deliveries were not permitted to reach their destinations, creating food shortages for those who had come to depend on them. However, perhaps the most widespread means was through the use of extortion and forced labour. Villagers are regularly called upon to provide their uncompensated labour to assist the military, building new roads and army camps, portering supplies and running errands. The villagers are taken away from their farms and forced to work with little regard for the agricultural seasons. Many villagers were unable to harvest enough food to feed their families because so much of their time was taken up performing forced labour for the military. (For more information, see Chapter 1: Forced Labour and Forced Conscription). In addition, various forms of extortion have been employed by the SPDC and their proxies. These may range from the payment of bribes in Chin State to be permitted to engage in cultural activities to an intricate system of “fees” associated with forced labour that are demanded from villagers in Karen State. Such fees are extorted from the villagers under the ruse that the money will then be given to fellow villagers performing labour for the military. Villagers, however, are almost never paid for the labour and the money invariably ends up lining the pockets of military officers and corrupt civil officials. (For more information, also see Chapter 5: Deprivation of Livelihood).

Whenever soldiers burn villager’s fields and plantations, mount patrols in farming areas or set up camps near villages or their fields and farms, it has a direct impact on the economic life of the villagers. In Karen State, SPDC army soldiers not only burned paddies and destroyed rice storage barns, they also prohibited travel and closed roads, cutting off trading routes and villager’s access to markets. The use of villagers for forced labour also contributes to their economic deprivation since it takes people away from their usual occupations and income generation. (For more information, also see Chapter 5: Deprivation of Livelihood).

The third strategy used in the campaign against ethnic minorities is their cultural assimilation into the Buddhist Burman mainstream. Commonly referred to as “Burmanization”, one such tool used by the regime is the destruction of culturally important sites or buildings and the construction of more Burman-appropriate structures in their place. In Arakan State, the SPDC plans to start a plantation on historically important land, on the archaeological site of the last Arakanese Kingdom. In Chin State, Christian Chins are prevented from building churches or holding religious events. Many Christian sites in Chin State have been demolished and pagodas and temples built in their place. Similarly, Muslim Rohingya face difficulty constructing new mosques or even repairing old ones. (For more information, see Chapter 10: Freedom of Belief and Religion).

The regime has enacted laws and actively prevents the expression of culture among many ethnic minorities, from the wearing of traditional clothes or the performing of traditional ceremonies to the prohibition on learning their native language. The Rohingya, a Muslim minority in Arakan State, are prevented from following their marriage traditions and wearing traditional dress when performing marriage ceremonies. Furthermore, many Rohingya are prevented from marrying at all and must first apply for marriage permits from the regime. The cost of such permits are prohibitively high and are besides, often denied. In Mon State during 2006, students at several educational institutions were forbidden from wearing Mon national dress at school or for school ceremonies. Meanwhile, in Shan State, traditional Shan costumes were banned from religious celebrations organised by the state. All of these actions attempt to destroy ethnic cultural identities and force ethnic minority groups into the mainstream Buddhist Burman culture.

In addition to these attempts at cultural assimilation, the SPDC continued its campaign to further marginalize minority groups through the manipulation of demographics, ‘importing’ Buddhist Burman settlers into traditionally non-Burman, or non-Buddhist areas. In Arakan State, the SPDC has confiscated land from the Rohingya, forced them to construct “model villages” on their own land, and then resettled the area with Buddhist Burmans from Rangoon. The settlers are given food by the junta, while the villagers, deprived of their fields and means of life, starve. A similar three year resettlement campaign remained underway in Shan State during 2006, forcibly resettling groups of ethnic Wa settlers into areas predominately inhabited by members of the Lahu ethnic group. Since 1999, the Lahu National Development Organisation (LNDO) estimates that approximately 125,000 people have been resettled in the border areas adjacent to Thailand's Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai Districts. [153] The UWSA claim this resettlement is part of a strategy aimed at providing Wa people with economic alternatives to poppy cultivation and that the resettlement is over. [154]

Various strategies of direct violence, economic deprivation and cultural assimilation are being used by the SPDC and the allied ethnic ceasefire armies in the ethnic minority areas of Burma. By far the most extensively documented in 2006, were those abuses which occurred in Karen State, due not only to the large-scale military offensive underway there, but also due to the extensive documentation network in place among the Karen. That said, the longer list of incidences shown for Karen State does not necessarily mean that the situation there is far worse than in any other state or division. Put another way, this does not mean that fewer documented incidences from other parts of the country demonstrates that fewer human rights violations are taking place in those areas.

Please note that the incidences listed below do not represent a complete catalogue of the campaign of abuses perpetrated against ethnic minority villagers. Those that are shown below are included to help illustrate the deliberate and discriminatory nature of these abuses. Please refer to other relevant chapters for more information.

There are approximately two million inhabitants of Arakan (Rakhine) State. The two predominant ethnic groups are the Buddhist Rakhine (Arakanese) and the Bengali-speaking Muslim Rohingya.

The Rohingya, for the most part, inhabit the northern region of Arakan State, near the border with Bangladesh. The Arakan Project, an independent NGO documenting abuses against the Rohingya, has characterised the area as one of acute poverty which is facing a “chronic emergency”, and the Rohingya as one of the groups facing the most discrimination in Burma. [155] Burmese military campaigns against the Rohingya prompted large refugee flows into Bangladesh in 1978 and again in 1991-92. Approximately 20,000 Rohingya refugees remain in camps in Bangladesh. [156]

The Rohingya have no official status within Burma. Bangladesh, similarly refuses to claim them as their own and as such, the Rohingya are a stateless people. They are not permitted to travel out of Northern Arakan State and must request permission from SPDC authorities any time that they wish to leave their villages. A single travel pass can cost 1,000 to 1,500 kyat. (For more information, see Chapter 12: Freedom of Assembly, Association and Movement). Fishermen in the town of Sittwe have to pay 500 kyat each to the immigration, military intelligence (SaRaPa) and the regional administration (DaKaSa) if they want to go out to sea to go fishing. [157] This only allows them access to the fish. Though, they are still not able to access the markets and must rely on middlemen to get their goods to market, losing out on much of the profit margin. (For more information, also see Chapter 5: Deprivation of Livelihood).

Even when Rohingya are carrying valid travel permits, they are not immune to extortion from SPDC army soldiers. Many Rohingya procure travel documents to move from the economically depressed Buthidaung Township to look for work in Maungdaw Township. However, they are vulnerable to exploitation as they return home, carrying the money they have saved. Troops at any number of checkpoints along the road often detain people and destroy their travel documents, thereafter demanding a fine from the person and stealing their money. [158]

Restrictions on movement also apply to those seeking medical care for cases where treatment is not locally available due to the extremely low quality of healthcare services in the region. Similarly for students wishing to continue to higher studies; education is the region is of extremely low quality and availability. (For more information, see Chapter 9: Rights to Education and Health).

The restrictions on movement, combined with the restrictions on business activity perpetuate a state of economic depression in the area. In 2005, Rohingya in northern Arakan State were unable to grow or buy enough food. According to Chris Lewa, coordinator of the Arakan Project, “A major humanitarian disaster was averted thanks to direct food relief distributed by the [World Food Program]”. [159] Ordinarily, the delivery of food by international humanitarian actors to the region is blocked by the regime. However, it is unclear how long the Rohingya can continue to rely on external aid for their daily survival. In March 2006, 126 students from an orphanage in Buthidaung faced starvation when they were unable to acquire enough rice. The state controls the flow of rice in the area and exerts strict restrictions on its transportation and sale in order to control the region’s markets. Although rice is available cheaply nearby, people are unable to travel even short distances to get it. (For more information, see Chapter 5: Deprivation of Livelihood). [160]

Since the 1990’s, the SPDC has been engaged in an initiative to pit the two ethnic groups of Arakan State against one another, favouring the Buddhist Arakanese and further oppressing the Muslim Rohingya. Under the auspices of the Ministry for the Development of Border Areas and National Races, land and farms belonging to Rohingya are frequently confiscated and given to settlers brought in from other areas, usually from around Rangoon, but sometimes even foreigners from Bangladesh. Soldiers are often used to force Rohingya farm owners to sign over and vacate their land, on occasion utilising torture and imprisonment to secure their signatures on ‘legal’ documents, which is ironic in that land ownership documents do not exist in Burma and that the state retains ownership of all agricultural land. [161] (For more information, see Chapter 5: Deprivation of Livelihood). The confiscated land is used to set up ‘model villages’, known locally as NaTaLa (Ministry of Border Affairs) villages. According to one report released in November 2006, villagers, often the same people who had been deprived of their land, were forced to provide uncompensated labour and materials towards the construction of the new villages and in some cases, also